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PERSPECTIVES ON BATTALION TRAINING MANAGEMENT

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Four battalion commanders were interviewed at length to explore their philosophies and goals for training, their training management practices, and training and evaluation techniques. Other topics discussed were ways that staff positions were utilized, the ways that commanders prepared for command, and the utility of training management doctrine and guidance. Positions taken by the commanders are described as representing points on a management/leadership continuum. Comparisons and contrasts are drawn among the four approaches to training management.

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This report is most likely to be of interest to researchers involved in studying the subjects of training management and leadership. It is a subtask report for a project to evaluate a battalion training management model developed at the USAREUR Field Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute. Each of the battalion commanders reviewed the training management guidebook, which incorporates this management model, and provided evaluative comments. The preponderance of opinions were critical of the guidebook. The authors recommend that further study be directed toward alternative delivery systems of training management doctrine as well as the preparation of officers and their development as managers. It is concluded that a variety of approaches may be appropriate and effective in meeting training goals. It is further suggested that discussions such as those contained in this report could provide useful material to officers who are preparing to assume command and who are in the process of formulating their own training management approaches.



FOREWORD

This report presents and compares the approaches taken by four battalion commanders to the requirements of training management in USAREUR. The research reported here constitutes a subtask of a project to evaluate a model of battalion training management. This work was performed at the Heidelberg office of the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) as part of Task 2 of Contract No. MDA 903-78-C-2042 with the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). The research is responsive to Army Project No. 2Q763743A794. Dr. William W. Haythorn was the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative.

The authors wish to express their sincere gratitude to LTC Benjamin W. Covington, III, to LTC Jack T. Garven, Jr., to LTC Jim Madden, and to LTC Frank D. Miller for their gracious participation and contributions to this project. Additionally, special appreciation is expressed to Mrs. Olivia Halbert, Mrs. Carole Marcus, and Mrs. Mary Beth Lankford for their many hours and dedicated efforts spent in transcribing the tape-recorded interviews. The authors are also indebted to Mr. Albert Kaplan for his part in identifying and interviewing subjects for this project.

PERSPECTIVES ON BATTALION TRAINING MANAGEMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

To compare alternative approaches to managing battalion level training within the context of evaluating a model of battalion training management.

Procedure:

Four battalion commanders were interviewed at length (from 90 minutes to six hours) and were asked to discuss and elaborate their philosophies and goals for training and specific approaches to management, training and evaluation. Also discussed were their preparations for command and their views on training management literature. All of the commanders were asked to review a training management guidebook which was developed at the USAREUR Field Unit of Army Research Institute and each provided evaluative comments. Tape recordings of the interviews were transcribed, analyzed and coded according to topic area, and ultimately restructured into a common format for presentation. Comparisons and contrasts were then drawn among those that were represented.

Findings:

There are diverse ways of accomplishing the general management practices of goal setting, allocating of resources, setting up a management system for achieving goals, and measuring progress towards the goals. There is, understandably, interaction between a commander's personality and the style and techniques which he finds to be effective. No one set of techniques or strategies appear to universally satisfy requirements.

Only one of the four commanders evaluated the training management guidebook favorably. There was also evident a disposition against training management literature in general. These negative views call into question both the acceptability of prescriptive approaches to training management, as well as the utility of a guidebook as a medium for transmitting such guidance. It is recommended that further study be directed toward alternative delivery systems of training management doctrine as well as the preparation of officers and their development as managers.

Utilization:

The collective perspectives, experiences, wisdom of the four battalion commanders, as represented in this report, should be of considerable value to researchers of training management approaches and techniques and developers of training management doctrine. It is believed that the commander profiles presented herein could serve as a model for the development of new materials for pre-command courses.

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INTRODUCTION

To adequately accomplish operational missions in USAREUR, it is necessary for units to conduct extensive training. Research conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences-USAREUR Field Unit since 1976 has revealed that (1) many soldiers are not prepared to perform their job tasks as given in their Soldier's Manuals when they arrive in USAREUR (Bonner, 1979); (2) many battalion leaders judge their units to be not ready for combat (Yates, 1979); (3) planned mission-orented training is frequently disrupted by last minute changes that involve personnel in non-mission oriented activites (Ryan-Jones, Bussey, Kaplan and Rice, 1980); and (4) a large proportion of duty time is spent by soldiers at all ranks in non-mission, non-productive activities (Ryan-Jones, Yates, Taylor, 1980).

Because of the above problems, and the signal importance of training for the acquisition and sustainment of combat readiness in USAREUR, the ARI-USAREUR Field Unit has conducted research to identify training management techniques that can contribute to the more productive use of time and resources for training. In conducting research on unit training management, the USAREUR-ARI Field Unit has followed a process that includes: (1) problem identification and clarification; (2) development of conceptual frameworks for understanding the nature of training management problems; (3) the generation and evaluation of management techniques and/or job aids aimed at overcoming training problems; (4) dissemination of conceptual and procedural products; and (5) recycling through the foregoing to continuously engage the problem of the improvement of training and training management in USAREUR.

Research following the above paradigm from FY 76 through FY 78 led to the development by the ARI-USAREUR Field Unit of management techniques that were found useful in a mechanized infantry battalion for managing unit and individual training (Buxton, Miller and Hayes, 1979). In FY 78 a draft guidebook that describes the management techniques was prepared (Buxton and Miller, 1979) and evaluated with regard to (1) its relationships to other training management guidance available in official Army documents, and (2) the comparability of the techniques in the guidebook to techniques used by battalion commanders other than the one mechanized infantry commander who cooperated with and contributed to the development of the guidebook.

Results of the evaluation of the ARI-USAREUR guidebook for training management techniques in relation to existing Army guidance indicated that, while there is considerable agreement between the main management concepts among the ARI-USAREUR guidebook and other Army training management guidance (e.g., TC 21-5-7), there are also considerable differences, with the ARI-USAREUR guidebook giving specific techniques for managing eight identified components of battalion training (Sticht and Hill, 1979).

Initial results from comparisons of the guidance in the ARI-USAREUR guidebook to techniques of training management used by other battalion commanders indicated that there are areas of management not addressed in the ARI-USAREUR Field Unit Guidebook, such as the uses of incentives and the management of non-training activities (e.g., guard duty, GED) to make them contribute more to combat mission/skill readiness.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To continue the development of training management techniques for USAREUR, the ARI-USAREUR Field Unit research program for FY 80 included two subtasks

of research on battalion training management. One subtask continued the evaluation and refinement of the management techniques and guidebook developed earlier through a study to implement and evaluate the previous guidance in a field artillery battalion. That research and a revised guidebook is reported elsewhere (Hill and Sticht, 1980).

The second subtask for FY 80 was aimed at generating directions for further mofifications and extensions of the model through contrastive analyses with other battalion management models being followed in USAREUR. It is this second subtask that is discussed in the present report.

APPROACH

As originally conceived, the approach for identifying new concepts and techniques for battalion training management was to involve a comparative analysis of two battalions, one considered by superiors as highly effective and the second considered as a less effective battalion. The goal was to discover factors that differentiate more effective from less effective battalions and to incorporate such factors into the revision of the ARI-USAREUR Field Unit's guidebook for battalion training management.

As it turned out, the foregoing was only partially achieved. Locating an exemplary battalion was fairly readily accomplished. Conversations with other ARI/HumRRO researchers and with officers responsible for teaching training management at the Vilseck pre-command course identified an armor battalion in Mainz as having an excellent reputation. However, a number of factors militated against proceeding as originally planned. The battalion

commander of the armor battalion was within a month of his rotation date, making a case study under his sponsorship infeasible. Identification of a not-so-effective battalion in which a case study could be conducted proved less successful. And finally, reductions by HQ ARI in level of effort devoted to the project during the year precluded the possibility of conducting extensive on-site data collection that would have been required to perform satisfactory comparative case studies of training management.

For the foregoing reasons, the approach for the contrastive analyses was modified to become an analysis of the approaches to battalion training management taken by four battalion commanders in four different kinds of battalions. This was judged to be a suitable alternative approach in that the training management practices within a battalion are likely to reflect the training management philosophies of its battalion commander. In addition, an evaluative critique of the ARI-USAREUR training management guidebook by each of the battalion commanders was sought and obtained. The methods and procedures reported herein reflect this change from the general approach originally conceived.

Method

A case study method was followed that involved the use of a semi-structured interview with four battalion commanders. The interviews were structured around the components and processes of battalion training management that had been developed in the earlier work by ARI-USAREUR (Buxton, Miller, and Hayes, 1979; Sticht and Hill, 1979). Figure 1 includes the major concepts that were discussed: performance oriented training, sustainment of performance, performance to standards, and accountability, and presents an 8 (Components of USAREUR Battalion Training Management) X

BASIC CONCEPTS

- o Performance Oriented Training
- o Sustainment of Performance
- o Performance to Standards
- o Accountability

COMPONENTS AND PROCESSES

Components of USAREUR Battalion Training Management	Processes to Perform for each Component: Accountability Analysis	Mission/Task Analysis	Scheduling	Performance Evaluation & Monitoring	
Major Events (evaluations)					
Unit Sustainment					Schedule Managed Subsystems
Individual Sustainment					
Mandatory Training					
On-the-Job Training					
Maintenance					SOP Managed Subsystems
Schools					
In-Processing					

Figure 1. Battalion Training Management Model for USAREUR: Basic Concepts; Structural Components and Processes.

4 (Processes to Perform for each Component) matrix in which each cell served as a potential topic for discussion with each of the battalion commanders. This procedure encouraged the obtaining of evaluative opinions from the commanders regarding their interest in the particular topic as discussed in the ARI-USAREUR training guidance, the extent to which they felt a particular training management technique was needed for each of the cells, and what techniques they used to accomplish the training management technique called for by each cell.

In addition to the information stimulated by the concepts, components, and processes of Figure 1, battalion commanders were interviewed to identify something of their philosophy about training and training management, their preparation to assume the battalion commander's role as training manager, techniques for implementing philosophies/policies, and areas in which they have developed techniques or approaches not found in the ARI-USAREUR guidebook.

In some instances, in addition to the information obtained by reviews of the semi-structured interviews, information about training practices was obtained by collecting written guidance materials that the battalion commanders had prepared and/or by study of the unit SOPs regarding training.

Subjects

Four battalion commanders were interviewed from four different types of battalions: armor, mechanized infantry, engineering, and field artillery. One commander (mechanized infantry) had been involved in the earlier ARI-USAREUR Field Unit's work to develop training management techniques; indeed, he had formulated many of the ideas contained in the ARI-USAREUR guidance. It was, therefore, of particular interest to have his views on training management and how his views may have deviated from those presented in the

ARI-USAREUR guide. At the time of the interviews, this battalion commander had been out of the battalion commander's job for some two years, and was serving as the training/operations officer (G-3) at the division level. Thus, this former battalion commander had had considerable experience beyond his battalion command to offer new perspectives on training management.

A second battalion commander (armor) was just completing his tour of command at the time of these interviews. Thus he had the benefit of hindsight and a past record of accomplishment to advise his commentary.

In contrast, a third battalion commander (field artillery) was contacted prior to assuming command while at the Vilseck Brigade/Battalion Commanders' Course. He agreed to participate in a detailed study that would, among other things, evaluate the ARI-USAREUR guidance for training management in terms of its suitability for a field artillery battalion, and the extent to which the guidance appeared so compelling as to be seized upon and adopted by the commander as his approach to training management. At the time the interview data reported herein were obtained, this commander had about six months of experience in the role of battalion training manager. Additional information about this commander and the field artillery battalion he commands is reported elsewhere (Hill and Sticht, 1980).

The fourth battalion commander interviewed (engineering) was in the middle of his command and was hence a seasoned training manager. He had spent the bulk of the preceding six years in combat engineering battalions, either as the training/operations (S-3) officer, the executive officer (XO) or battalion commander. He thus commented with the advantage of many years of experience in engineering battalions, and with a year of experience as battalion commander when interviewed for the present study. Unfortunately,

due to a malfunction in the tape recorder used to record the interview with this commander, the first half hour of the roughly one and one-half hour interview was lost. This fact restricts the data available for this commander.

Procedures

Data collection was obtained through interviews with the four battalion commanders. The duration of the interviews varied from around 90 minutes for the engineering commander to 180 minutes for the armor and mechanized infantry commanders, and some 360 minutes (6 hours) for the field artillery commander. All but the mechanized infantry commander were interviewed at their battalions. The mechanized infantry commander was interviewed at the ARI-USAREUR Field Unit in two separate visits.

The tape recorded interviews were transcribed and the resulting transcripts have served as the primary data sources, with written guidance materials supplementing the interview materials in some cases.

In reporting the results of the interviews, the transcripts have been culled for information bearing on the categories identified above and in Figure 1. Because of the flexible nature of the interviews, not all commanders commented on all topics. Further, the relaxed nature of the interviews at times permitted considerable digressions. Thus, rather than presenting simply edited transcripts of questions and answers, it has seemed advisable to present synopses of important points made. Complete transcriptions and supplemental materials have been delivered to the ARI-USAREUR Field Unit to fully document the summary results presented in this report.

RESULTS

The results of this study represent an accumulation of the philosophies, insights and management techniques of the four participating battalion commanders, extracted from approximately 340 pages of typed transcripts, plus an analysis of the comparability and contrasts among the perspectives presented. The summarized viewpoints of each battalion commander are presented separately at first in order to portray a somewhat integrated profile of the commander as an individual while he addresses a wide range of topics. This form of presentation is then followed by a review of the major topic headings and an analysis of the various perspectives where clear parallels or contrasts can be drawn.

The topics touched upon in the different interviews varied somewhat but presentation of comments from each has been restructured to follow the same broad categories which are listed below:

1. Philosophies
    a) goals, priorities
    b) leadership
2. Approaches to training management, to include
    a) roles of key personnel
    b) management concepts and techniques
    c) training concepts and techniques
    d) maintenance of vehicles and other equipment
    e) professional development
3. Preparation for command

As will be apparent, many comments overlap categories but are presented where they seem to be most relevant to the development of the commander profiles. The final topic presented, on which all battalion commanders were asked to comment, is the utility of training management literature, and, more specifically, the guidance in the ARI-USAREUR training management guidebook. Because evaluation of the guidebook was an underlying research objective, this topic is treated separately and the pertinent comments of the battalion commanders are consolidated under this separate heading.

In the military literature, discussions of commanders' roles have sometimes used the concept of a leadership/management continuum (e.g., Roberts, Military Review, 1980) to represent differential emphasis on these two constructs. While this is a somewhat artificial continuum given the overlap in possible interpretations of the two terms, leadership is generally used to denote activities which involve addressing or directing groups of subordinates, the presenting of a role model, the teaching or conveying of principles of deportment or conduct, and the like, while the term management would be used to apply to activities such as the monitoring of records, resources, giving procedural guidance to staff members, and so forth. In reviewing the interviews with the four battalion commanders, it is possible and potentially useful to consider these commanders as representing different points on the aforementioned continuum based on the relative extents to which they rely on their characteristics as leaders or managers in the running of their battalions.

The presentations of the profiles will begin with LTC Madden who was the sponsor of the case study which spawned the development of the ARI-USAREUR training management model. Not coincidentally, he is seen as the most managerially oriented of the four commanders with whom training management was explored.

MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION,
LTC JIM MADDEN

Philosophies, Goals, Priorities

Throughout the 78 page transcript, LTC Madden deals almost exclusively with the subject of training management in some way or another. Therefore, differentiation between statements which represent his philosophies and statements about his training management practices must be somewhat arbitrary. Under the heading of philosophies, a collection of statements is presented which discuss in general terms what training management is and what LTC Madden sees as common failings in the way training is managed in many battalions. In pointing out some of the problems to be overcome, he alludes to some of his own management approach and objectives he had for his program.

"I'm not sure there is such a thing as training management. I've always been fascinated by the fact that there's management and there's programs, but the way you manage training is exactly the same way you manage everything else. . . . Management, by a contemporary definition, . . . is nothing more than the supervision of a program. Then a program is another tangible thing; it is a system for obtaining a goal. So your key words here are goal, system, and supervision, and you supervise a system to obtain your goal. . . . The point is you can't have training management unless you have a goal for it."

He goes on to say:

> The place where you've got to start then in any management program, training management program, is you've got to start out with your goal. It's got to be obtainable and measurable or observable. Then, . . . once you've got your goal in terms of what you're going to measure in terms of performance, your systems are primarily in two categories: allocation of resources over time of your limited resources, and your

measurement system for measuring whether you are obtaining this goal.

When asked about the supervision and feedback process, he said:

> What you do is you take your goal and you break it down into sub-goals and you have a definitive system for ensuring that each one of those [sub-] goals is met. And then you go into your goal measurements to see which one of those items that you want to observe and check and how often you want to check it. That's how you come up with your supervision.

LTC Madden maintains, however, that the most critical first step, that of establishing a clearly articulated, attainable and measurable goal, is frequently overlooked.

> But my contention is everybody thoroughly understands the [scheduling] system. They thoroughly understand how to put a calendar together, how to plan their Table VIII practice here, and so on and so forth. The fundamental weakness, as I see it, and why I've tried to develop this program, is they have only the vaguest articulation of their goal, which creates tremendous inefficiency in their system.
>
> They have almost no concept whatsoever of what they should supervise. Now, they know how to supervise events within the system, but they don't know how to supervise their program because their program is going towards no obtainable goal.

He illustrates this latter point in the next excerpt by a sort of mock comparison of two battalions (his own and a hypotetical battalion). In so doing he gives substance to the distinction between quality of training and effective management of training.

> So what you have is what I call . . . management by event is your typical management program. If you were to walk into my battalion when I am conducting squad training and you walk into another battalion and he's conducting squad training and both of our squad training events or activities looked exactly the same, then you would not have any idea whatsoever of how I was managing and how he was managing. Well, . . . this man's got a pretty good system and he came up with squad training, so they must be good.
>
> What you don't see by that is in my battalion every single quarter you would see the same squad training. The typical program,

what I call management by event, is, you will say to yourself, without any systematic process for getting there, "My squads are a little weak; I'm going to do this. I go to Hohenfels next month and I'd better get them ready to go. So, I'm going to put on the squad event and it will be the most magnificent squad training program you've ever seen." Then he kind of decides he wants to go out and do some river crossings, so he'll go out and do a river crossing. And then he'll decide, my mortars are pretty bad, I'd better put some time on . . . So each of these events looks absolutely super, but he has no criteria for how often he ought to do this, or what he needs to do. So there's a sub-set of items that never get done because he's so worried about these events, and there's so many events that get done on such a haphazard schedule that it doesn't sustain proficiency.

Later in this conversation, LTC Madden points out that, not only is it important to have goals that are attainable and measurable or observable, but they also have to be acknowledged by everyone who contributes to attaining those goals.

Well, the beauty of this program [in this battalion] was that if you went to any company commander or machine gunner--and this is one of the acid tests for an effective management program--if you walk up to a machine gunner, squad leader, company commander, platoon leader, my S-3 or myself and asked any of us, what is the standard for machine gun proficiency in this battalion, everyone of them would have told you, identically, that if you walk in a typical battalion in the Army and pick an important weapon like a TOW, and say what's your standard for TOW proficiency in this battalion, they can't tell you.

They'll say, "Oh, that's in FM such and such," but I'll say, "Is that right? How about the ARTEP?" "Well, you know, I want to do the ARTEP too." "Okay, in the FM there's some written tests that are mandatory before we go on the fall location. Do you consider those written tests mandatory?" "Well, gee, I'm not sure." Well, anyway, you go down now to the TOW platoon sergeant. And I say, "How often do you have to do that?" "Oh, yea, once a quarter." You go down to the TOW platoon leader and you say, "What are your standards?" You're going to get a different answer. And I maintain you don't have a program if you don't have everybody reading off the same script. Now that doesn't mean you don't have good TOW training, but it means you've got a hell of a lot of inefficiency in the system.

In a more specific discussion about the nature of goals and how they are determined, LTC Madden acknowledged that goals change over time, sometimes frequently.

What the goals are is variable. Well, you have to keep in mind too that whereas you can specify perhaps for a given battalion, given it's GDP mission, a set of goals that remain constant, but beneath that, there are the very dynamic group of subgoals, based upon your last feedback as to where you stand now for the next 90 days or whatever your time horizon is--six months or whatever the case may be, modification of where you're going to put your resources to the subgoal accomplishments, and so you're constantly suboptomizing because you obviously don't have enough resources, principally time and, of course, fuel and so forth, to accomplish what you would like to do in all the subgoals.

Probably the larger set of goals will be adjusted over time as new commanders come in and see things from a different perspective, and as the unit's mission might change on the GDP.

Briefly, the next three excerpts restate and summarize some of the principal points that LTC Madden made with respect to training management.

I'd say it's all very simple. You show me a management program without a measurable goal and I'll show you a non-managed program. You know, I don't care what they do, I don't care if they have a chart like this or they do it like this or they do it any way, but if you can't walk in and say what is your criteria for sustained proficiency and he can't show you an articulation of something and you go to a company commander and he can't articulate the same thing, I'm telling you, you ain't got sustainment. And you don't have a program. Now that doesn't mean you don't have good training and it doesn't mean that that outfit isn't going to be able to do a creditable job when it goes up to do it's mission. But it does mean, in my way of thinking, the guy has wasted some resources in the process.

. . . . . .

I don't think there is an ultimate. I think every training management program is a successive approximation of what works for you under the circumstances. I think this basic underlying philosophy holds up in any training program.

. . . . . .

Where I think you would have the biggest payoff is to agree on what are the absolute essentials of an effective management program. I would like to convince you that they add up to three: a goal, a system for meeting that goal, and a process of measuring where you are in meeting that goal and taking corrective action.

Approaches to Training Management

Under this heading we will take a look at when and how LTC Madden decided that he needed to systemetize his training program and some of the techniques he tried and eventually incorporated.

LTC Madden was asked if he had mapped out his approach to training management prior to taking command.

> No, all I knew was, well, you know, I walked in super confident. You know, I wrote the manual on [FM] 21-6 on how to prepare and conduct military training and . . . I just kind of instinctively felt I knew how to do that [training stuff]. As long as I was in there a couple of months I kept saying to myself, "Gee, I'm doing super training. But where the hell am I going?"
>
> My events were looking good. You know, if I went out for mortar training, it was looking like good mortar training. But I kept asking myself, "Am I really sustaining?" And then there were some other things happening. I found out when I went to Graffenwoehr that if nobody qualified on the machine gun range, it's because nobody had fired a machine gun since 1972. And I took over in 1976.
>
> Not even the old people had been on the range. In four years. Because there just wasn't quite the interest of the former battalion commander or the former brigade commander to get guys qualified on their 50-caliber machine guns. . . . The TOWs, you know, they'd done super 18 months ago, they had a big task and they did wonderful. . . . Now, everything that battalion had done had been super training. They'd gone out on this exercise and they'd done this and they'd done that, but you were just going from event to event. You never quite--. Where you were going was to "have good training." So you had good training and you kind of went home at night with a warm feeling in your chest that, "Gee, I really had good training."
>
> But what the hell do you accomplish in this training? It's like--I keep going back to the President of General Motors. Now, he's walking through his factory and boy, I'll tell you, guys are just bolting those doors on and the cars are coming out all shiny. But it's kind of like the President of General Motors. No one has ever told him how many cars he's selling and he's just kind of going home every night saying, "Gee, we're just really building a fantastic car; I wonder if we're selling any of the . . . [things].
>
> Well, I can tell you, the President of General Motors damn well knows whether he's selling his cars. But I didn't know whether I was sustaining proficiency.

Then, what was his goal for training management?

What I set about was to build a model whereas I could walk out with great comfort in that battalion everyday, and while we weren't training on everything that I wanted to train on, the bottom line was every hour of every day . . . [would be] applied to a training requirement based on a systematic, but simple, and not time-consuming rough analysis of where the highest payoff to us was on spending that hour.

And how did he go about analyzing and specifying his goals for training?

There are several subsets of goals. In the infantry one of your big subsets is weapons proficiency. So what I did was, I don't have enough time to be proficient in all these damn weapons. . . . You add up all the weapons and all the jobs that he [the soldiers] performs and you find there . . . is not enough resources to accomplish that. It's just humanly impossible to train him to do everything that he has to do. . . . I can't assimilate all that information.

So that brings you into a system of management where you have to prioritize. So we're talking I'm going to have to get some goals for weapons proficiency. I list every weapon just subjectively, based on my own experience on the contribution it's going to make on the battlefield. And in the infantry I start off with my TOWs, my long-range anti-tank weapons Then somewhere up there, up near the top, is going to be my dragons, my medium anti-tank weapons, my 50-caliber machine guns, my artillery, my four deuce mortars. Now, I come on down there and I've got some rifles and some things. Now, when I get to the bottom, I've got things like hand grenades and Claymore mines.

The fate of Europe is not going to be decided by the hand grenade. I mean I'm just going to tell you that. It's going to be decided by tanks and TOWs and artillery. . . . If something has to drop out, the hand grenade's going to go.

Now, I don't want any of it to drop out, so what then I do is I say--TOW. I'm going to make sure that that gets done. I'm going to do that on a quarterly basis, and I'm going to provide the resources. Now, if I did it each quarter and the guys were already trained and I just had to sustain their proficiency, maybe for that whole platoon that's going to take me a month to get that done, for those people. Then I go through every weapon system like 50-caliber. I want to do that say every quarter. That's going to take me about three weeks of work. Then I add up all the requirements in the whole battalion, frequency times time per quarter, but I've got to track it through individuals, you know, I'm not mixing TOW guys with rifle guys. There's different guys that follow different tracks.

Then how did he determine the frequency of training that would lead to sustainment?

> Your typical division will run a battalion ARTEP evaluation about once a year. They'll run a company test once a year. They will run mortar firing for record once a year. Not that they're not doing other mortar training; but I know that wasn't sustainment. Now, how much is enough, I don't know. I've got to make a guess as to how much is enough. And actually I gained a lot of insight as I was going through it on how much is enough. But I had to start at some point, so I started quarterly. But, well, to continue a long story--I listed every weapon system I had, and every requirement I had; frequency times time, and then I added up the days in the whole year and I thought I'd override the number of days available by a large percentage, but I only came out about 20 percent over of what I actually had.
>
> Now. You know, I'm lost right before I start. I've got a year and two months worth of training to do in a year. So then I went back systematically and I cut out tasks or I lowered the [frequency] standard on some tasks so that it would fit in a rough-cut way.

Here we get some clarification on how training goals were adjusted to fit within the time available.

> Your question was how do I lower standards. Well, I wanted to do river crossings, but I didn't want to do them every quarter. I did them every six months. And a river crossing for me was going to take about two days to get everybody out there and come back. Now I was 20 percent over so I had to cut back. Well, I went back and a river crossing was a low priority, so I said I can't do the river crossing. I just can't afford four days out of the year because you don't train every day. You've got to maintain, you gotta do everything. The rule of thumb, and this will vary from battalion to battalion, but as a rule of thumb, when I was doing my gross analysis, I figured I could train three days a week.
>
> Intensive training three days a week times 52 weeks comes out to 156 days a year. Well, four days out of 156, that's quite a big chunk, when I've got all these weapon systems. So I changed that and I said no, I can't conduct a river crossing exercise. . . . What I'm going to do is, once every six months I'm just going to swim my tracks and that will take me one day, so I know my drivers will know how to get in the water now. And simultaneous to that I'll want a sand table exercise with my commanders on the command and control techniques of the tactical doctrine on how to fall in on a bridge head or a river crossing site for the control procedures to get across.

That way I'm kind of in a gray area. I'm not totally proficient in river crossing, but I've got some reasonable perception that if I have to cross one, my commanders are current on the doctrine and know procedurally what to do, my drivers can swim and that cuts me from four days a year to two days a year. And that's how I went back and lowered standards. . . . Now on things like TOWs, I would never touch those standards because I have priorities.

For a specific weapon system, how were goals and standards specified? He chose as an example the 50-caliber machine gun.

I stated precisely what proficiency meant by listing the tasks right out of the Soldiers' Manual, not all of them, but the ones that I felt would indicate [that] this guy is proficient. Then I said, "Now, who must do it?" And this is overlooked a lot of times. I've gone to machine gun ranges where every company would send maybe 50 guys to the machine gun range and some of these guys would never see a 50 because of their job. Some guys that were right up there commanding tracks that would use a 50 all the time weren't out at the range. We were checking off boxes "50-qualified", but they weren't the right guys.

So I specified precisely who would be qualified and then I specified how frequently I must do it. Now, you have to understand. These are my minimum standards. If I can qualify a hundred guys, that's fine. So I got a little task here. This is my goal on 50-caliber.

Caliber 50 machine gun qualifications: driver, vehicle commander and gunner on each vehicle. Okay? Those three people on each track would be qualified on each vehicle on the 50-caliber machine gun. It's done quarterly. I estimated that it would take, in each quarter, one day and one night to accomplish that . . . and here's the standard or the reference out of the Soldier's Manual . . . and the tasks that define certification: load, reduce stoppage, unload and clear, engage targets with a 50, set head space and timing, mount and dismount the sight. Now, if these guys as a minimum, right here, the driver, the vehicle commander and the gunner, could demonstrate satisfactory performance on each of these tasks quarterly, then I considered myself sustaining combat proficiency on the 50-caliber machine gun.

Later a similar example was elaborated for the TOW weapon system. This example gives an indication of the analysis that went into goal and standards specification.

My standards for TOW, because it was so critical--all personnel assigned to the TOW platoon--I mean that was the platoon leader down to the newest driver--60 some people, every quarter--will demonstrate their capability to load, correct malfunctions,

unload, and clear the TOW based on the standards on page 23J2 in Soldier's Manual 7-11B1. Sixty some people every quarter engage targets with TOW, qualify as at least a first class gunner, and that's important. We have a normal curve of weapons qualifications, you have marksman, sharpshooter, expert, and qualification means marksman--the lowest one you can get. Well, that's not my standard. On the other hand, I don't want to put down here that every guy will qualify as expert because it's got to be attainable and I can't get it. So I would go down normally to the one just below the top but it would also be well above the bottom. I couldn't just say "qualified"; I'd have to say "qualified as first class gunner" or "qualified as a sharpshooter" and every one of those sixty people every quarter take a TOW launcher cell test and preoperational inspection. And that written test I was telling you about in the book--there's some good information in there about time of flight and things that you have to know. . . . So, while we deal almost exclusively in skills, but we do know there is a requirement for knowledge, so the last task was, "answer at least 20 questions" and I think there was a total of 24 in the book on written tests and that written test was TC 23-20, pages 103, 138 and 139. So that then defined for me my minimum--there's a lot of other things I want that guy to do on the TOW and this is embarrassingly simple but it's like a foundation. If I were doing all of this and I had a basic foundation of combat readiness and any free time I had I could spend on doing other things, but, by God, I knew day in and day out this bottom line was there and it wasn't happening just by "Hey, maybe we ought to have some TOW training and some mortar training". I mean systematically every quarter.

LTC Madden, in discussing his own battalion, placed greatest emphasis on the process of goal determination and specification; he addressed the evaluation and feedback process, or supervision as he referred to it, to a lesser degree; and he barely touched on the system for accomplishing the training. From previous conversations and from the report of the case study in his battalion, this intermediate process is known to have consisted primarily of assigning responsibility for training, making the goals and standards known to those who were responsible (at all levels), and allocating resource support for training by the responsible parties. Most of the training per se was presumably a company level responsiblity and the role of the battalion then, after establishing the goals and standards, was to monitor and evaluate the progress of the subelements toward achieving those goals.

However, some of this distinction may again be arbitrary in light of the philosophy espoused elsewhere that "all training is evaluation, and all evaluation is training."

When asked to explain his system and techniques for monitoring progress toward the unit's goals, LTC Madden went a little further in explaining the dual nature of training and evaluation.

> Now you have to understand the philosophy that the test is the training and the evaluation sheet is the lesson plan. . . . What we would like to see when we want to teach a guy how to disassemble a machine gun, he takes the Soldier's Manual and the test right there on how to do it. It's his [the NCO's] lesson plan and he teaches the test. Now, that's fundamental to this whole program. . . . Now, you can have what you might call formal evaluation which is heavily supported by outside personnel with rigorous checklists and the guy is going through for record, but if you run training, the guys should theoretically have the same checklist. That's his lesson plan that he's evaluating from and he's running them through the exercise and he's saying, Gee, they're doing pretty good here and pretty good here, but lousy... so this afternoon we're going to go back and concentrate on this and this. Now, at the end of the day you have them running through a formal test, but the guy that's giving the training has as good a perception of whether they can do this and this and this as if the guy were standing back there formally evaluating.

And getting more directly into monitoring from the battalion perspective, he continues:

> But on the basis that the lesson plan was the test, then at the end of the week all of the commanders came in with me and we had a . . . simple system on the lesson plan where we just went subjectively through with a red, yellow, or green grease pencil and . . . if we thought overall they received a SAT on that ARTEP [task], based on that, we put our green X through there. And if there was a little question we put a yellow and if no, they just didn't pick it up, then we'd cross through in red. And that was one of the beauties of our management system, was that it was so simple. You didn't have a lot of forms and so on but the key word which comes under the title of supervision to goal, which is what you don't see too much of here in this manual [TC 21-5-7] is accountability. We maintained the accountability of precisely where we stood on meeting every one of our goals.

LTC Madden was asked if this was a subjective estimate against each one of his goals.

No, I say it was only subjective in the context that our whole evaluation process was subjective. You get down to 50-caliber machine gun qualification--that's strictly non-subjective. I've got measuring points there--you can come in and say I've got 8 out of 30 machine gunners qualified--but when you get into tactical environment, when you go to the ARTEP, there's no formula that you will ever find in the ARTEP that says he's got to pass 18 out of 20 events. It says there's 18 events--hey commander, when you go through all these SATs and UNSATs and relative contribution, then you make a subjective judgment because that's the only way you can measure tactical training, and in that context it's a subjective judgment for a tactical exercise. But for TOW training, no--you have [plenty of] records.

Delving further into management techniques, LTC Madden explained the use of a wall chart in his office which facilitated both monitoring and planning with respect to his weapon system goals. The chart consisted of a matrix which had his training tasks (e.g., TOW, M60, etc.) listed in order of priority on the left hand side and the column headings across the top referred to calendar quarters. (Thus each cell represented one task during one quarter.) When projecting events for a future quarter, a task would either be assigned a green circle or a red circle. A green circle signified that training was planned for that particular task for that quarter and a red circle indicated that no training was planned for that task or weapon system. As the quarters passed and events were held, the centers of the green circles would be filled in with a color coded to indicate how well the units performed on that task. The chart, therefore, provided a quick reference to what types of weapon system training was projected for a subsequent quarter while it also showed how recently and frequently each task had been evaluated in past quarters, and additionally showed what the most recent performance status of the unit was on each task.

In the next excerpt, LTC Madden tells how he used this chart. He begins by talking about filling in the circles to represent performance statuses.

Then he talks his way through a hypothetical planning session using the chart (the distinction to keep in mind is that the colored ring, or outside circle, was used for planning, and the colored center of a circle represented evaluated performance against the battalion goal).

> So originally, if I had everybody qualified and I met my goal, I filled this circle in with green, if they weren't, I'd put it in red. Well, I ended up with all reds because I didn't have 65 guys [qualified (the original goal)]. I had 64 guys. Well, that wasn't telling me anything. Red could have meant I had 64 guys qualify or it could have meant I had nobody qualified. So once again, just subjectively off the top of my head, I went for 80 percent. If I had 80 percent or more qualified, I put it in yellow. If I got 100 percent I filled it in green, and if I had less than 80 percent, I put it in red. Now, there were other things I did with this chart. . . . I always projected my training six months ahead intensively day by day or blocked it, by grouping days. . . . So as I am projecting forward, if there was no time in this quarter even to conduct TOW training, then I made that circle red and if I had it scheduled and it hadn't been done and it still came up, I did the circle in green. . . . The reason I had to do that was I looked down there and said, "In three quarters where do I stand?" Well, when I went down that three quarters, I saw TOW and I had already finished that. I only got 60 percent qualified and didn't have time to go back. I had to go on to 50-caliber and some other stuff. This one, hell, I hadn't done that. Well, when am I going to do it? Well, that's why I went to red and green because I could look up there and if it was a green circle I could say that's an event that's scheduled this quarter, I just haven't gotten to it yet. If it was red, I said no, I'm not doing that. . . . Well, as I'd go through the two red circles in a row, then I'd say, hey, that's why you're dropping off. But look here. On this skill, . . . M60, I've done that green three quarters in a row and those guys are really quite good on that machine gun and I can see down here that the pistol, . . . I had to drop that out three quarters in a row because it was very [low priority]. Nobody's going to get shot on the battlefield with a pistol. [But] I think this time I'm going to just scratch this quarter's machine gun training and I'm going to insist that I get that pistol work done.

One other incidental item came up much later in the interview with respect to individual training. It came out of a discussion about whether troops are adequately trained in individual MOS skills when they arrive from AIT--

"You don't need to do a study; he's not trained"--and if not, how does the battalion adjust to this problem?

> I say it is a nonproblem. It is a nonproblem because I cannot cope with the problem. I didn't have the sources, time or the inclination to bring in PVT Smith (who just happened to have arrived with three other privates on Wednesday), now I'm going to get two more privates on Thursday and sit down and diagnose where their weaknesses are and where their weaknesses are not? Based on my time, resources and I must say, probably my personal inclinations, I just took those two soldiers, threw them in a rifle squad, they got thrown into the mill like everybody else and when it came up the next week to the quarterly machine gun qualification, they went out and did the quarterly machine gun qualification with everybody else. But I think it's absolutely "moon beams" to think that you can take a soldier and diagnose him and put him on some little track. . . . We start at one end of the swimming pool and if everyone is swimming and that guy is kind of floundering, then you put a little bit more attention but you don't have the resources to pull him out, put him in another pool and say, okay, now we're going to have a separate little course for you on how to swim. I have like 700 plus men in that battalion, we have about 30 MOSs, multiply by skill level and you end up with a hell of a lot of requirements. I can't slice it that thin.

Preparation for Command

LTC Madden had relatively little to say about experiences that prepared him for battalion command, so this portion will be presented in a question and answer format just as it appeared in the transcript.

Q. How did you get trained to be a battalion commander?

A. Through osmosis.

Q. What about the management school at Vilseck?

A. That's a two hour course on training management. A couple of hours, something like that.

Q. Did you apprenticeship to learn the battalion commander?

A. Sure, as a battalion S3 and as a company commander.

Q. Does everybody go through that to become a battalion commander? An apprenticeship learning?

A. Basically, not everybody is going to be a battalion 3, but it's not [essential]--I learned almost everything I know about command, training, everything else when I was a company commander.

LTC Madden had also alluded to his experience at TRADOC prior to taking command and how he had been exposed to a lot of the then current training management concepts that were being incorporated in FM 21-6 (in which he was personally involved) and TC 21-5-7 "Training Management in Battalions." His remarks suggested that contact with and exposure to the thinking of General DePuy and General Gorman had also influenced his development.

COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION COMMANDER,
LTC FRANK D. MILLER, JR.

Philosophies, Goals, Priorities

LTC Miller had arrived at his priorities for training through his own analysis of the demands that will be placed upon his unit in a combat situation. In these first two excerpts he discusses the nature of these demands and how they relate to his goals and priorities for training.

> I have some very strong feelings about what it takes to survive in the kind of environment we would face in a hot war with the Soviet Union or somebody who has as many tanks and guns and airplanes as they do. First of all, I think that based on our defensive philosophy, if you will, that first we have to make sure that our equipment and our soldiers are in as good a shape as we can get them. If I can't get them there, and sustain them once they are there, then the plans go out the window; there's no plan. So, I put a very high priority on maintenance type training and on physical training. I think vehicles have got to be in good condition and I think people have to be in good condition at the git-go. Assuming then that we have that, then what do we have to do? We have got them there; we go from here to wherever our general defense position is and we are in position. Now we are ready to fight. What's the next thing that that soldier has to be able to do? He has got to be able to stay alive. He may put in to that first target but, if he gets blown away at that first target, he may not get to the second target and we have lost him. So I have to keep those fellows alive long enough to put in the bulk of my defensive positions. Hopefully extract them later for the purpose of maintenance as the war progresses. Therefore, my second priority is on survival skills, common soldiers and survival skills. That includes NBC--how to survive and fight in an NBC environment. I treat any kind of a mission, not as an engineer mission, if you will, but as an integrated tactical whole. If you are going out to blow up a bridge, the obligation of that squad leader is to use troop leader procedures; give that squad an operations order; make sure they have everything they need; make a recon of the objective--or at least make a map recon. [Make sure] they have some idea of what they need and make sure they have got it. They take their tools and equipment with them when they go down there; they park their vehicles some distance from the objective (if there is enemy activity in the area); they use bounding and travel overwatch, infantry tactics, to get down there and they sneak up on it; and somebody goes down and recon's it and makes sure it's clear of mines and booby traps (that there's no enemy around). They set up a little security and call the rest of the team forward. They do their thing and then they put their security out. They do their thing and then they extract. They

extract the same way using some kind of bounding overwatch; they get back to their vehicle and shoot the coop back to their next objective. Now, if they leave all that out, if they do as they did when I first got here, given a mission to blow up a bridge--everybody hops in a truck, drives down, parks the truck on the bridge and everybody gets off, does his thing and gets back in truck and boogies--you have only one small part of the whole. None of the survival skills are there. The first time Ivan sees you drive up to a bridge that he holds and he doesn't want you to have, he is going to unload on you with tear gas or an artillery barrage or a multiple rocket launcher attack, or whatever, and do you a job. Whereas if you get there quiet and sneaky and he doesn't know you are there, or there is a good chance he doesn't know you are there, your chance of survival has just gone up about 50 points. So survival skills, after peacetime maintenance of men and equipment, are next in importance. Then third and last, if not least, is the engineer peculiar skills. It's great to know how to prime a demolition charge. It's great to know how to do a pre-chamber. It's fantastic to know how to get up a bridge for demolition or to build a super special bridge, or whatever; put in a minefield. But, if you haven't got your equipment running, and you can't get there and survive to do the next one, it doesn't do you any good to know how to do those things. So that's my priority. And my number one priority above all of that, above the maintenance, above the survival skills of the individual soldier, and above the engineer skills, is the professional leadership and development of the officers and non-commissioned officers. You have got to have leadership skills. You have to know how to do these things and make their soldiers do them or all of us hurt.

Later in the discussion LTC Miller augments this last point, and again summarizes his prorities for training.

> The next war is going to be a squad leader's war anyway, at least from the engineer's standpoint. Our guys are spread all over the map. I have this horrendous sector I am in charge of and I don't have enough engineers to do it, and the squads are going to be stretched very, very thin. If that squad leader isn't capable of handling himself by himself and having the confidence in his own ability to get from A to B and C and back to B to pick up his chow and his gas, beans, blankets, and bullets; he's going to go under. So I concentrate on, as I say, equipment and people, individual training, and then professional development of my small unit leaders.

Another aspect of LTC Miller's philosophy extracted from the interview has to do with what he believes enlisted personnel generally experience in their first term in the Army, and how he prefers to treat and deal with his personnel. This grew out of a discussion in which he was describing the

benefits that he saw in the German system of inducting, training, and retaining a soldier in the same unit throughout his enlistment (or conscription).

> An awful lot of dislocation and fear and trepidation, and whatever, with these youngsters we have here in Europe result of the fact that they come into the Army, and it's a great shock to them, and their first week of basic training is hell. And finally they get adjusted to basic training. They get used to the monotony, if you will, 16-hour days 6 days a week, maybe Sunday off, if you are lucky and you made your bed right that week. They get used to that. They make a bunch of friends in basic training. They are going along together, they have platoon esprit, company esprit, and then they go on to one station unit training which now improves that a bit. They go on to AIT with the same company, the same bunch of guys, and then all of a sudden--zow--they are all fragmented to smithereens and, if you're lucky, you and two or three of your buddies out of your platoon will go to Europe together. But the rest of them scatter and you never see them again probably. It's another serious dislocation so, when I get them here, they are just like recruits. They are just lost and bewildered and don't know what they are doing. . . . I think it takes a man almost his first enlistment before he gets over the cultural shock of having been treated like a faceless, nameless, numbered entity, yanked hither and yon, having clothes thrown at him and nobody really gives a damn about him as a person. And it isn't really until you are two-thirds or three-quarters of the way through your first enlistment that somebody says, "Hey, I know you, Jones. How would you like to reenlist?" Well, you know, it's no wonder we can't hold but ten percent of our people if we are lucky. We don't treat them like people. If companies, if civilian corporations had a ten percent retention rate of all the people they bring in every year, they would go bankrupt. They couldn't afford a training program, could not afford it. Why is it we can afford the training program that we have? How can we afford to lose ninety percent of our first term soldiers every year? It's appalling when you think about it, appalling. We'd go bankrupt in a year; we could not make it. You hire people on and you have to start from day one treating folks as folks, because if you don't, you are going to lose them. You look at my reenlistment statistics for the year I have been in command. I am pretty damned proud of them. I reenlisted 160 percent [of quota] of my first term soldiers, almost 200 percent [of quota] of my careerists, half of them for present duty assignment. How do you do that? You treat them like people. The day they get here you learn their names, you call them by name out on the street. You get interested in their wives and kids and care about them as people.

The final excerpt under this heading has to do with LTC Miller's goals and expectations for his unit. This statement was made in response to the question, "Do you have enough time to do all that you want to do?"

> Of course not. I don't. I do the best I can in the year that's available to me. I think progress is measured in millimeters. One inches away at it and when one looks back over a year's training program, one says, "Yes, we made progress or no, we didn't." I don't think a unit is ever ready, completely ready--100 percent--as a battalion commander would like it to be. I think my objective in two years of command is to leave my battalion in better shape than I got it.

Approaches to Management

Under this heading we learn how LTC Miller organizes activities in his battalion to meet some of his training goals. The first discourse deals with how he addresses his highest priority, that of individual and professional development of his personnel.

> I run a rather extensive professional development program here in the battalion. We have classes every Tuesday morning for officers and NCOs. We have separate officers' and NCO classes one afternoon a week. I run a leadership development course that I take out of my own hide here in the battalion in addition to the PNCO and BNCO and all these they run. I run my own leadership development course for my E4s who are coming close to being an E5. And I run them through a two week exercise with subjects like drill and ceremonies, PT, performance oriented hands-on training, communications skills--that sort of thing. You get them used to being leaders to make that transition from non-responsive E4s to responsible E5s as easily as possible. I run my own maintenance courses, my own operator's licensing courses, a rather extensive education program. I am trying to get into the use of civilian education opportunities. I have run a rather extensive food service education program in conjunction with Central Texas College here, using my own mess hall as a laboratory, putting all my cooks through a series of courses in creative cooking and menu preparation and preparation of institutional meals and that kind of thing. And they get college credit for that. They are all fired up about it and I get much better meals in my mess hall. Now I'm looking to try and get some funding, about $42,000 I think, to set up the same sort of thing for my maintenance people, my operators, vehicle operations, my mechanics, my motor sergeants, all of that. It's a small price to pay. Right now I have, I guess, three, four, seven non-commissioned officers diverted from primary duties of running squads or platoons to running two

schools, a leadership development school and operator maintenance. Plus a DDC school that I run here in the battalion. If I could return those seven NCOs, or maybe six of those NCOs, leaving the one guy to manage the schools exercise with CTC [Central Texas College] back, it's cheap. Maybe forty-two grand a year. It would take more than forty-two grand to train one E6.

Here LTC Miller briefly discusses his role and the roles of the battalion S-3 and the company commanders in the development and execution of quarterly training plans. He also identifies some problems that had previously existed in the way the S-3 and the companies related.

The S-3 is really my training arm, if you will. He is my right arm for training operations. He comes to me and he gets the guidance from me as to what I want to accomplish in this particular year, this particular quarter or whatever, and he puts a training guidance letter out to the companies based on my input. And what I do is, I say, "Okay companies, within this three-month period, two of those weeks, two of those twelve weeks belong to me. That week I am going to do bridge training and that week we are going to the field for a field training exercise for squad testing. The rest of the time is your company commander's. Now here is the minimum I want you to cover in the following areas that I think are vital to the overall success of the battalion. I want you to spend some time on NBC training in the following areas: decontamination of personnel," that kind of stuff. And I say, "I want you to cover those things as a minimum. When we go to the field on that field training exercise this quarter, I am for sure going to test you in those areas that I am saying that you must train in as a minimum. Now, whatever time is left over from that, you can train on anything you want to train." I did that last year and it didn't work really well. My company commanders had never had that freedom before. The previous S-3 told them what to do every week. The S-3 was commanding five companies. He was saying you guys will train in this week, and this next week when they went to squad testing, for example, the company headquarters didn't even go out. It was just nine squads that went out and all nine squads reported to the battalion TOC [Tactical Operations Center] and got their missions and went out to do separate things and were evaluated by the TOC. [It was] a squad leaders to S-3 interface. There was no chain of command interface at all. No, wrong! That isn't how we are going to fight the war. Why train that way? Why is it that the squad leaders can come to the battalion TOC if he wants information? He's got to learn he has to come to his platoon leader, or his platoon sergeant, to get his information; and that guy has got to go to the company commander to get information. The company commander is the guy that has to come to see me. He's the guy who shows up in the battalion TOC or my operations center if he

wants information. So we had to turn all that around. Now the S-3 is the extension of my insistence on what I want to have happen. It didn't work [before] because they really were not trained well enough to be trainers. They are getting better.

In getting into the techniques of programming and managing training, LTC Miller explained that his battalion employs a variation of the X, Y, Z concept of consolidating and rotating battalion and community support requirements among the companies. By this method one company provides all the support for details generated within the battalion or imposed by community, while the other companies are ostensibly free to train without interruption. In addition to the "duty" company, a second company is tasked to provide support to the companies that are in training by acting as aggressors, providing evaluators or controllers, obtaining and assisting with training aids, and so forth. These duty and mission support companies are also encouraged during this period to send eligible individuals to BSEP (Basic Skills Education Program) and other education courses and to have individuals take care of all possible types of personal business and appointments. This system of rotating detail support is a very common practice within USAREUR units and, in fact, is encouraged by TRADOC's training management guidance in TC 21-5-7. However, the period for which the duty status is assigned varies among battalions, generally from one to six weeks. Here LTC Miller discusses the ways his battalion has tried to use this approach. He also gets into further specifics of his scheme for organizing training, including the way he regularly integrates vehicle and facilities maintenance and maintenance training into his schedule.

I started off with a six-week cycle, okay, three weeks as a duty company, three weeks as a mission support company, and six weeks in prime time training; two companies in prime time and two companies in mission or duty, flip flopping, then another six-week

block, then another six-week block. Unwieldy, because they took my training guidance and they kind of programmed what they wanted to in the six-week period and it may happen or not happen, and they came back and they complained to me, "Well, we're not getting enough time for maintenance. All we are doing is training; we are not getting enough time for maintenance." Wait a minute, time out! Maintenance is training too. I never said you couldn't put a week of maintenance training in your training program. "We never get a chance to do anything interesting. All we are doing is mine warfare, demolitions, and that sort of stuff, that we do over and over." Nobody ever told you you couldn't do adventure training of some sort. Well, I stepped back and I said, "Okay, for FY 80 they still need more training in how to be training managers. So okay, we are going to cut it back to four-week cycles and I am going to tell you what you are going to use each week for. Within that week it's up to you to train your people as I have instructed you to do." So what I have now is a four-week prime time training cycle. I still have the mission support company, the duty company, but it's two weeks on and two weeks off now instead of three weeks on and three weeks off, and I have two companies in prime time training. Each of them will be there for four weeks at a time. Then there is a week of individual training; there's a week of collective or unit training, individual training coming out of the SQT Manual, collective training coming out of the ARTEP Manual. There's a week of what I call augmentation training which is really adventure training where they can do an escape and evasion course or a 50 kilometer hike if they want to or work on construction projects which the troops love, incidentally. It's not something they don't want to do. They like to do that kind of thing. It's a break from the monotony of whatever. But all those kind of adventure things--go to Garmisch for a week if they can swing it. Those kinds of things are available to them in that augmentation week. And then the final week is maintenance and logistics training where they know it is not a matter of counting mess kits and outfits or maintaining the trucks, rather training people on how to take inventories and what a hand receipt is, and how to check a truck and what are the inspection points and how to pull a service on a vehicle. All these kinds of things. How to read the manual, how to do the Army Maintenance Management System, maintenance and logistics training. In addition to that, in order to get the maintenance I felt I needed, one day a week we shut the battalion down for everything but maintenance. I have a matrix and I plan out for the whole year and every Thursday we maintain, from 7:00 in the morning until 4:30 in the afternoon. Nobody goes on appointments; nobody goes to the dental clinic, to the hospital or clears your quarters or anything else on Thursday. Everybody in the community knows the 317th doesn't take appointments on Thursday. Every week the vehicles and trailers, certain items are maintained every week. Things like weapons, every other week; NBC equipment, once a month; off the wall things like our M57 mine dispensers, for example, once a month. But there is a matrix that shows them what on this particular Thursday. Thursday the 13th of December, they will maintain all vehicles, all trailers,

all tentage or whatever, camouflage nets, the M57s and whatever. They have that list, so they know what they are going to train on that Thursday, what they are going to maintain that Thursday. That's when they do the physical maintenance. Now one Friday a month, as installation coordinator, I am responsible for keeping this place looking like a military installation, like somebody lives here. The third Friday of every month, all we do on that Friday is clean up the post. Everybody cuts grass and rakes leaves and paints piping and does that kind of thing, so that 12 times a year we do that. That helps a lot because we don't have to play catch up ball quite so badly for an AGI and at the same time, anytime somebody comes on this installation, it looks like a proper installation--somebody lives here that's proud of themselves. And you know with crumbling, decaying, nasty facilities you have to keep after them all the time or it goes downhill in a hurry.

Evaluation techniques

When asked how he finds out whether his unit is ready to perform its missions, LTC Miller briefly outlined his approach to evaluating his battalion and its elements.

I have periodic inspections to test whether they are ready. I have a commander's quarterly inspection program; every 90 days I look at each company in detail. I have my whole staff descend upon a company for a three-day period; we have an in-ranks inspection, we have about an 8 station mini-SQT where we run individual training testing, where we see if they have done what they were told to do during that quarter's training program. This is where I look at equipment, people and individual training. The commander's quarterly. I look at unit training on a series of field training exercises at least once per quarter every year. The ARTEP tests the whole battalion, but I have squad tests and platoon tests. I also have CPX's for companies and battalion level headquarters to make sure that we can do all the communications and reporting and interfacing and resource management that we need to do at company and battalion level.

Preparation for Command

There was relatively little discussion of this topic. The questioning was aimed primarily at learning where and how LTC Miller had learned or developed his approaches and techniques for managing training. As with the other commanders questioned, experience in units laid the primary foundation

for the formulation of his management approach, and study of the available literature had augmented to some extent his perspectives and techniques.

> This is all stuff I have developed over a period of the last six years now, since I left Ft. Leavenworth as a C&GS graduate and went to my first battalion as the S-3. It's been a long and painful--I have done nothing but be a muddy boot soldier since 1973. All that time I have either been an S-3, XO, or a battalion commander in that period of time. So I am very much steeped in what goes on in an engineer battalion, in combat engineers. I was in a divisional battalion for four years and now a year under my belt here as a battalion commander. So combat battalions are my forte. I have done nothing but combat battalions. I have been in six combat battalions throughout my military career and I am a muddy boot soldier from way back. So this is where I think my value to the military lies. . . . I like talking to soldiers, I do what generals tell me to do, but my strong points are to get soldiers to do what I want them to do, and hopefully, teaching non-commissioned officers and junior officers how to lead soldiers. That's where I am happy.

When asked if he had drawn together and documented his training management philosophies and practices, this was his response.

> I don't have a book per se. I have a synthesis, if you will, of everything I can get my hands on in the field of training management that I can read, accepting what I believe in, discarding what didn't sound reasonable to me. I have tried an awful lot of things, some of them horrendous failures, some of them marked successes. And what I just outlined to you, which is pretty much your concept here I think [in the ARI-USAREUR Guidebook], plan it in great detail, force execution, test for feedback, plan the next cycle based on the results of the feedback. That's the way I do business.

FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
LTC JACK T. GARVEN, JR.

Philosophies, Goals, Priorities

Of the four battalion commanders interviewed, LTC Garven had most recently taken command of his battalion. In light of this fact, a considerable portion of the interviews were given to discussing the activities of preparation for command and the early command experiences in terms of getting to know the battalion and making himself and his objectives known to the battalion. Conversely, because the interviewer had been conducting a case study of training management practices in LTC Garven's battalion over several months, the topic of training management was not pursued to the level of detail that it was in other interviews. A further note is that portions of the interviews were lost due to tape recorder malfunction and, therefore, the material presented here is occasionally supplemented by notes made during the interviews and during previous conversations with LTC Garven.

Along the management/leadership continuum discussed earlier, LTC Garven is seen as representing a position, philosophically, nearer the endpoint defined as leadership. This inference is based on a number of statements and observations. While he involves himself at the most basic and broadest aspects of management, he emphasizes the importance of delegating the execution of management tasks. Under his command there is a great deal of emphasis on personal deportment. He personally tries always to exemplify the standards he wishes his subordinates to aspire to. With respect to training he talks about the importance of the attitudes of trainers and trainees and the need for dedication to one's job. One underlying assumption in the differentiation of leadership and management is that attitudes, beliefs and ways of thinking

are not managed, but are affected by personal interactions. Each of the excerpts presented under this heading deals in some way with such beliefs and ways of thinking. The first evolved from a discussion of the need to integrate maintenance and training and to see maintenance as having training value.

> It's like the trinity. Too many people attempt to compartmentalize. They say, well, there's a thing called training, and then there is a thing called maintenance of equipment, and then there is a thing called the welfare of the troops. Too many people see training as a day on the rifle range, or a day on the LTA or maybe MTA. Maintenance is motor stables or changing tires, and welfare of troops is time off, a pass or a new field jacket. . . . What I submit, like Rommel says, the best welfare we can provide for the troops is the training that they need to survive if we ever ask them to do what this uniform stands for, and that doesn't mean they can't have time off, but if we had neglected the maintenance of the equipment, or allowed soldiers to neglect the maintenance of the equipment, then we haven't looked after that soldier's welfare because he's going to die because of his equipment. If we haven't trained him in the use of his equipment, likewise, we have not seen to his welfare. Now that's not to suggest that we can keep him up 24 hours a day going through the post combat courses, firing howitzer rounds, pulling PMCS's on vehicles, because I know that he needs sleep and has needs here and there. When you start thinking about maintenance as separate from training, and separate from troop welfare, then I think you get away from the issue. The closer you can bring those three things together the better, and that's why I say . . . you don't get a "go" on firing battery operations until you include maintenance in it. That's where we have got to be on maintenance and maintenance training.

The next excerpts discuss the importance of attitude to accomplishing training, both on the part of the trainers and those supporting training.

> I'm convinced that if training in any subject is imaginative and if the instructor will bring with, or the leader will bring with him, this zeal of the importance of the subject, then that is the first and most essential ingredient in any sort of training.

. . . . . .

> It's like believing in God, you either do or you don't. If you don't think training is important, then you can't conduct a very convincing training program, and certainly not a very enjoyable one. . . . So I guess the first thing you have to do is train-up the thinking or the attitudes of the trainers. And, let them know it through your personal conviction--demonstrate that it is important. But somewhere in there,

you have to let them know in no uncertain terms--and I'm talking about the trainers--the training managers--that, if they don't do that well (you would hope with the voluntary zeal and gusto that you had), they will be evaluated accordingly. . . . Then you have to demonstrate. You have to keep your promises to them, too. And, you have to be as consistent as you can be about that. You can't be, "Oh yea, training was important but, my God, look what's biting on us here." The situation changes all the time. Everybody knows that, but in the long haul, training is important and it's got to stay up there and it can't be constantly reassuming its position after we take care of what is "really" important.

The question was then asked how this attitude is conveyed to the troops; how it is made known to them that their job is important.

Well, I tell them that when I can and then I give them awards and I encourage their battery commanders to seek them out and recognize them so I can sign a piece of paper and put it in their hand during formation. Another thing I try to do is to get the dirt balls out of the battalion. That is an indirect way of saying, "Good soldiers, we know who you are; bad soldiers, we know who you are too. Bad soldiers we are getting rid of!" That's not the direct approach but I think that has a far reaching effect on the soldier who is doing the job and doing it well. Soldiers don't hear often enough that they are doing a good job. . . . Every job we have in battalion is important. If the individual doesn't feel it is important, there are probably several reasons for that but it's not because there are unimportant jobs. We don't have one job in this battalion that isn't important.

LTC Garven feels similarly about the importance of training to the soldier.

The things that we teach him that he has to do are right now, real world, and they will touch him. It's not, you know, "after you get to be a section chief, you'll need to know this." It's right now.

In talking further about training, LTC Garvin said that, as much as possible, he thought training should be fun, imaginative, challenging in some way. He acknowledged also that this isn't always possible, but talked about the training he likes to see.

But the thing that encourages me the most is to go out and see something in action. Example, the 2nd of the 78th put on a thing called a section ARTEP and it was a combination of skills that you would expect a howitzer section to perform coupled with some survival skills in a NBC environment plus navigational skills of all in sort of a leadership

> reaction environment. It was a station thing--you drove from A to B, sometimes you take your howitzer, sometimes you go overland, this is the situation, get there. It's very much like a leadership course but heavy on artillery skills. And they ran that all over the LTA. Well, I thought that was just as neat as anything I had ever seen. . . . And I watched what 2/78th was doing and it was muddy--like a tar pit out there. It was just miserable--couldn't be worse. And yet they were doing it and the troops were really enjoying it because it was different. It was imaginative, creative almost. It gave them a chance to do some problem solving things, you know, it invited the lowly private in to figure out how you get across this 20-foot ditch which was full of water and everything else--with two clothes hangers and that sort of [thing]. And so then we did our section competition, and I went out and watched that. That was purely artillery. But it hadn't been done in this battalion in a long time. It was different than any other training that had been conducted. And it was competitive. They were going against themselves as well as other units, against their own section mates, sections within a battery, but also battery against battery. And there were outside evaluators so there wasn't that sense of parochialism, you know, when we try to do something ourselves. . . . We got the 6th of the 10th to send over gun chiefs and they umpired it for us. So it was really a good training experience. And I learned a lot from that. And the lieutenants learned a lot from that and I think the participants learned a lot about it, about themselves and where they have to be to be best.

The next area of philosophy explored has to do with "truth telling", a principle strongly held by LTC Garven. He considers the capacity to interpret people and people's interactions as one of the most important "commodities" for himself as a battalion commander. He has to be concerned about seeking the truth and how people perceive the truth, not merely for the sake of integrity, but for the utility in the decision making process. That is "more important than understanding the howitzers." Truth telling constituted a major agenda item during the transition workshops held for officers and NCO's when he assumed command. LTC Garven asserts that, regardless of how the circumstances reflect on the teller, a commander needs accurate information upon which to make decisions; this is so all the way up the chain of command. In his own

words, LTC Garven expresses some of his feeling about "truth telling" [this is the only portion of the discourse captured on the transcript]:

> Truth telling is very closely aligned with promise keeping to me. It's a bond, an implicit contract between communicating human beings and I just find it to be a very fundamental necessity in human relations. It's not to be violated. Now, does that mean that I've never told a lie? Does that mean that I don't lie? Does that mean that I won't lie? Probably not. Probably not. But that has to be a commandment, an ethical commandment, one holds so high that when you violate it you've considered it--you've considered it. It must not become that situational thing which becomes just another technique, just another means of communication, just another means of achieving an ends.

And closely related to the principle of truth telling is a goal that LTC Garven has for himself and his battalion: that is to be open to inspection by anyone at anytime and found to be operating in compliance with all applicable regulations and directives. And in fact this openness was evidenced in LTC Garven's willingness to support an in-depth case study of training management within his battalion.

Leadership

During the interviews, LTC Garvin addressed several aspects of leadership. He discussed qualities he looks for in leaders, expectations, responsibilities that leaders have, and ways he uses his own leadership role. First with respect to qualities:

> Honesty, sense of dedication to unit, selflessness, and I guess enthusiasm toward self-improvement, even though that sounds like selfishness. I like officers, I like NCO's who are trying to better themselves for reasons other than making more money and getting more rank, if I make myself clear; to be better and to be willing to accept what comes from being better rather than trying to be better so you can get something for it. A sense of dedication to something other than personal gain or personal advancement, but honesty, and a sense of dedication to duty.
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> . . . . . .
>
> I expect that extra thought, that extra effort from my leaders. I really don't expect it from privates.

The following excerpts go further into the expectations he places on his leaders, particularly in terms of level of effort, and brings out some of the beliefs and reasons behind these expectations.

> I do believe that most people can do more than they think they can, or that they want to admit they can, but I don't believe that they will necessarily do it voluntarily, I think they have to be pressed. When they are pressed and they survive and they stand back and see their accomplishments, then they can say, "Hey, that was Hell, and I don't ever want to have to do that again." That's one statement, but at least they know that they can do it. And so I'm inclined to push people. To give them more to do than they have ever done before. Perhaps more than they think they can accomplish. I'm also prepared to understand when they don't accomplish it all. That's a message I don't think I've sent clearly enough to my officers and my senior NCO's. They understand my requirements, and they understand that they are numerous. I don't think they are settled yet about how I will respond if they fail. There is no amount of talking that I can do to allay their feelings of anxiety. We will just have to see. Maybe it's best not to talk about how I'm going to forgive them when they fail.
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> . . . . . .
>
> I'm really ashamed that I don't push my officers any harder than I do. They may not agree with that, but push in the sense of not smothering them with my supervision and my assistance to them and my nagging but to give them a hell of a lot to do. A hell of a lot to do. And expect excellence from all the things that I give them but be willing to accept something less than that. That's the part I don't talk to them about. But I don't think it serves them or the unit or the nation at all to say, now, okay, let's don't do all of these things. Let's just pick out one or two and do them well. Because when you go to war, the situation is not going to be--let's pick out a couple of these penetrations that we're going to work on and get those right and just don't worry about these other ones. It just doesn't work like that. You have to be quite a juggler and you've got to enjoy some success on a lot of fronts. And I think the way you train-up to that is to push people to their capacity. Because I think that sort of stretches their capacity when you do that. And so I think the full life is the good life and I try to keep their lives full.

The short excerpt below gives one indication of how LTC Garven likes to exercise his leadership role with respect to the soldiers in his battalion.

> I think it's important that I be up front in things of a congratulatory nature. Not just because I want to be not only the battalion commander and good guy, but I think privates don't see that many LTC's. And I'd much rather see them in that light than have to stand [them] in front of my desk for non-judicial punishment. So I like the giving out of awards and decorations. I really do. . . . [And] when you do something good, you need to be told you did something good.

Approaches to Training Management

In considering approaches to training management, we will look first at the tone of training management and then the framework that has been developed for a progressive training cycle. This will be followed by a review of the roles of personnel involved in training management with a further delineation of specific battalion and battery responsibilities. The first series of statements deal with the primary locus of control of training and training management.

> I see that the best training, and this represents somewhat of a change from what I thought when I first came on board, that the best training is going to be achieved by a very autocratic and strong commander and staff control of the training that is conducted. I listen to the bromide of, and even espoused it, of centralized planning, decentralized execution. It does not work. The reason it does not work, is because those to whom I would decentralize the execution don't know--the very thing I have the most of [experience], they have the least of and I'm asking them to perform the nitty-gritty managerial tasks of this decentralized training and it just doesn't happen. And so I find that I have to pull into me structured, deliberately set up through my staff and commanders, certain training things--vehicles, blocks, exercises, drills--and I have to, in some sense, take away from commanders and staff officers, some of the prerogative that would come with a decentralized execution training philosophy, because I don't have across-the-board, even experience.
>
> So I have to look at the training that sweeps across the entire front of the battalion and say, [for] example, 13 Bravo [cannoneer] training is fundamental to this battalion. I must not leave it entirely in the hands of the battery training managers who are my battery commanders. Not that they don't have a part to play in this but in some aspect of this training cycle I must now get involved. I must dictate what's going to be done. That's what I did with the hands-on training and the written portion preparation to the SQT. And that was not to be the end all of 13 Bravo training. Rather, that was supposed to be the showcase of the standards and tasks that had to be performed--to what standards they had to be performed. And it was done by the elite of the battalion. And now then, I would expect the battery commanders to take this and with those other section chiefs who weren't up to the elite just yet but having gone through these stations themselves, now take that as they experienced it and go out and do all the things that they said they were doing all along that I knew they weren't and won't because they can't. They don't have the time and they don't have their own people enough. But, now when they say, "give me my people. Let me train my people." I say, "Surely, take them but now you know what the standards are. You've seen them."

. . . . . .

And I will give them some of that decentralized execution, but I don't have the same expectations for it's accomplishment that I did when I first came on board.

. . . . . .

But in terms of managing training, I am moving more in the direction of centralized planning and centralized execution and I'm not sure that that's wrong and I'm pretty sure, the more I do it, that it's right. There will be those who will say that you're crippling your commanders--that is not my intent and I hope it's not what's happening. I'm just giving them the things that I really, in my judgement, . . . feel they can handle. The strong ones will come to me and ask for more. . . . My charge is to make sure that the basics, the fundamentals, the things that make this unit functional, combat ready as a battalion, are achieved through training. And I find myself being very autocratic.

General Framework for Battalion Training

In this excerpt, LTC Garven outlines the overall progression that battalion training is intended to follow.

I have tried to set out a pattern of cycling training that follows what I think are reasonable lines based on the personnel turbulence that I have, and knowing that the product that I am receiving right out of the training center is not a finished product, and knowing that just the simple changing of people requires team drill, even if they were all proficient which they are not, and so I see a cycle coincidental with the SQT testing time, a cycle of SQT training to pass the test. That's about as basic as I'm willing to go. In other words, what may be expected on the examination becomes the lesson plan for the training. You teach the test is what I'm saying. I don't start all over again and say, "Okay, Gentlemen, we number the Howitzers from right to left one, two . . . ." Now, I don't do that, but I do have them stop at the station and say at this station you will be required to set off a deflection in so many seconds within so many minutes. Okay, so that's the individual training. Couple that with annual requirements for weapons familiarizations, qualifications, NBC gas chamber drills, other sorts of general subjects mandatory sorts of training . . , and that can happen anywhere in the calendar, but I do try to set out for the high-density MOS's a block [of preparation time]. That's my individual training, and that happens on a recurring basis. Annually for the SQT. The map reading, the rifle qualification and familiarization is driven by the mandatory requirement for some of these things, and shored up by our trips to Graf where ranges are available to us for this. That's individual training. Then in preparation for the battery ARTEP that we conduct, I would like to start an annual section competition as we had [this year] and determine competively under that test circumstance who's the best and who's the worst--to

hype the good guy and embarrass the others. . . . Then let that lead naturally into the MTA which has been dedicated for battery training.

Section competition. MTA for battery ARTEP, ARTEP up front, first week if possible. We had a shakeout FTX this time, I may not even do that next time. . . . ARTEP up front, evaluations given to batteries and then let them go the rest of the MTA. Schedule them some ranges, play some sports like we're doing, but give them the bullets, let them go out and shoot and do all the things they want to do. Then before the next MTA comes, schedule battalion sorts of FTX's. . . . and have some exercises in the MR [maneuver rights areas]. In the meantime, the batteries can continue when they are in the X block of the weekly training schedule to go out to the LTA or to the MRA on their own, and train as that module. But, the year looks like this--individual training, section training, battery training, battalion training and then it starts all over again.

Then LTC Garven explained how this general cycle is both driven and constrained by certain external factors, not all of which are predictable.

Well, MTA changes. Right now there's some talk that our February time may not be in February. But that doesn't make any difference. I can stay on the pattern, I mean if it's in March or April. It's still going to be my battalion ARTEP time and only brigade tells me differently. I had a battalion ARTEP in March. The next MTA period does not have to be a battalion ARTEP unless there's a variable in the formula. I am scheduled for some sort of technical verification inspection for certification and then there is some requirement that says you have to take a battalion ARTEP within so many days of that inspection, you see. Well, I know I don't have one of these inspections coming so I'm reasonably sure that my next MTA is going to be a battalion ARTEP administered by brigade. . . . You see, I really only have . . . about five requirements. But I only have about three knowns.

The SQT test. I have a window and I go from the last day of that window and I move this way and see what things occur on that path--you know, in a backwards planning sequence and the first thing I run into this year is REFORGER. Okay, through REFORGER I run into an MTA. And then I have two periods where the most inconvenience I suffered was NATO 35 site guard but I figured I could work around that and then the next thing I hit was my TVI, I'm backing up toward the first of the year and there about the time when I came on board was our battalion ARTEP. So, I'm having . . . [the S-3] right now draw a calendar of where we are now and trace on this calendar of events all the knowns that we have, or the best information that we have and I'm saying, okay, [with] the idea in mind of going from individual training to section training to battery training to battalion training, how does this sequence of events fit now based on the MTA periods we're going to be assigned?

LTC Garven then mentioned that there was a possibility that the battalion could get a third training period at the major training area during the coming year and discussed how this would fit into his general plan for the battalion.

> According to my philosophy, okay, we've finished battalion, now we need to go back to individual training. I see that third MTA period that we're being offered as a good opportunity to do that by simply moving out into the bivouac area and practicing some individual general subject skills. Living in the woods, concentrating on firing our individual and crew-served weapons more than firing our howitzers. Certainly we'll take our guns [howitzers] with us but that won't be the thrust of this trip. And the trip may only be two weeks long. Try to get a gas chamber exercise, try to get a decon exercise. Maybe have a pretty comprehensive NBC [Nuclear, Biological, Chemical] county fair [with all] sorts of practical applications. . . . You know, that sort of thing. Just run the whole battalion through those things.

Training Management Roles

Following an overview of the annual outline for training, the focus of the discussion was turned toward the personnel on the battalion staff who are responsible for planning and carrying out the training objectives.

> Question: How would you briefly delineate the roles of key training management staff positions?
>
> LTC Garven: Well, I see myself as sort of the final say of any training plan that we have. I've taken on the self-imposed additional duty of scrutinizing the training schedules. Those are the weekly training schedules that the batteries construct. I [also] look at what we inherit by way of major events that take up time and then the S-3 and I discuss when we want to plug in those things of a training nature that do not appear on the mandatory schedule, i.e. MTA, inspections, NATO Guard and that sort of thing. So, my role, I guess, is the overall trainer, manager. . . . I get a great deal of assistance, of course, in this area from the S-3 who receives from the higher headquarters the commitments, so to speak. The calendar, as best we can know it from above. . . . The S-3 is certainly the allocator of assets, time being an asset. . . . [The S-3] probably is as close to our German allies as anyone . . . and MSG Brooks [the operations NCO], is really instrumental in our communications with these people. Anything we can do to maximize interoperability training we do at the convenience of the two battalions because Schönbach [commander of the German unit] has got his problems just like we've got our problems and his calendar just like we have ours. But whenever possible we try to mesh those two.

And next, the Assistant S-3:

> Well, let's put the AS-3 in his role. He played a big part in all things in the 3 shop. He was the right-hand man so he was very much into all training, training commitments. He was the test control officer for the battalion and he's the SQT guy. The scheduler and the watcher of the schedules, poster of the test time, and that sort of stuff. He was very much involved in NRAS [nuclear release authentication system]. He ran the NRAS and the NRAS training.

Summarizing comments about the roles of other staff officers, LTC Garven believes that the ideal situation is for the XO to be the senior staff officer to serve as second in command and as chief coordinator of the staff. He outlined the training functions of the S-2 as coordinating the scheduling and content of necessary intelligence and security instruction such as classes about Status of Forces, Soviet Military Liaison Mission (SMLM) and Sabotage and Espionage Directed against the Army (SAEDA).

And finally the Command Sergeant Major:

> My Command Sergeant Major provides me a great deal of assistance in the NCO professionalism part of our training which he handles almost entirely on his own. But he also gives me an assist by running the learning center. He has kinda got the responsibility for that and the SQT, not just the high density MOS's, but all MOS's. It's sort of his purview. It comes under, if you look at an organizational chart, the S-3. But the test control officer is really the only "by regulation" requirement that we have to have out of the 3 shop. I didn't strip what [the Assistant S-3] was doing away from him. I just attempted to give him some help. Before he was the only one that was doing it. He was the one who was telling the batteries about the notices that the people should have received. About the submission of the PCC's, about those sorts of things. Now the Sergeant Major has built a learning center/SQT team. . . . So I guess the three biggest honchos in our training program are myself, the S-3 and the Sergeant Major. And Sergeant Major especially for individual soldier skills, SQT types of training, training management, scheduling, and certainly in preparation for the test itself--the pretesting, practice testing, writing.

Command Emphasis

During the discussion of training management roles, the specific role of the commander and the effect of command emphasis were further developed.

When asked how he makes known to the battalion his priorities and standards, LTC Garven replied that he communicates such things directly to the officers, and also through policy statements. He doesn't talk directly to NCO's about general priorities and standards but communicates through the CSM. This corresponds to his desire to make the chain of command work as it is intended. In terms of feedback, however, his standards also become known when he expresses displeasure that they are not being met. Addressing this latter point:

> And in answer to your question, I go where I think I'm needed based primarily on nonsuccess, not the way I'd like to do it. I'd like to go everywhere and I will in time. . . . But right now I only have the time to go where I think I need to.

The following two examples illustrate the potential effects of command emphasis--i.e., direct involvement by the battalion commander. They involve two goals of the commander, first, to have the arms rooms and small arms in "top notch" condition, and second, to have each soldier retain and monitor his own job book. The latter is normally a section chief function. LTC Garven's expectation was that requiring the individual soldier to maintain his own job book would increase his sense of involvement and responsibility for his own progress.

In the first instance, LTC Garven conducted the arms rooms inspections himself, and by the second round of inspections, he noticed marked improvements. In the second case, his desire to transfer responsibility for the job books to the soldiers took the form of an announced directive. A couple of months later, relatively few soldiers had actually been given their own job books.

In the next several excerpts, LTC Garven reflects on these two situations and the results of his own involvement in them.

> But, even these weapons, these arms room inspections that I conduct, I won't say are beneath me, but I probably shouldn't be doing this. But I'm still trying to set a certain tone in certain areas that I consider

to be important and I feel the way that I can show the world that they are important is to get personally involved. So I've noticed a great, great deal of emphasis, appropriate enphasis, and a significant turn-around of the care and cleaning of weapons from the Grafenwoehr trip [compared to] when I first took over. I'm not saying that no one ever inspected them before, I'm just saying that that wasn't very high on their list of things [that are] important and how it is. . . . Now if I find dirty rifles and ammo, which I do, the response I get now is just the response I want. The battery commander calls the section chief that's responsible for that and he gets the individual that's suppose to clean that rifle and they usually clean it right there. You know, even before I get out of the arms room--not to show me, but just to get it rolling. That's not something they're going to take care of tomorrow morning any longer; it's something they do right now.

. . . . . .

Well, I just didn't handle the job books like that. You know, I thought the philosophy and good sense would be enough to get it done.

. . . . . .

The job books in every individual soldier's hands, that didn't happen. . . . In some cases it did. But in most cases it didn't. Because here is another example of centrally planning what I wanted done and decentrally having it executed. My Command Sergeant Major attempted to keep it centralized in that he was going to call in key people from battery but he didn't call in each section chief. He left that to be done by whatever agent he had in the battery--the First Sergeant, I guess. And it just didn't get done.

But because I did not go down every step of the ladder and say, "Hey, do this because this is what I want done. Be damned why I want it done, this is what I want done and you make double damn sure that you explain it to the guy that you turn it over to," in just those terms, "and you make it what you want done." It's just like inspecting arms rooms, I just didn't go down every step in the ladder. And so it didn't get done.

I think part of the reason is, the people who have it to do, people who you would think would share the reasons for doing it in the first place, don't share those reasons. And if they don't share them, if they have reasons of their own which they view as greater for not doing it . . . down at that distance, you know, when you know it's coming from the top, you can put it off.

But, you see, there was no consequence for not doing it. . . . And, if I'd have said, "The next guy found without his job book is going to get an Article 15"--that negative sort of leadership which sometimes gets a lot of things done but you should be very judicious in the way you use it. It would have been done.

LTC Garven also cautions that a commander must be very judicious about the number and type of things in which he does get personally involved to the degree discussed above. In fact, he places a great deal of emphasis on the need to delegate tasks and responsibility, both to challenge and develop subordinates and also to afford the commander a relatively even, continuous perspective of the operating of the battalion as a whole.

> It's the battalion commander who is involving himself on the level of minutia that is going to be detracted in some way from his freedom of movement. In other words, if you take on a problem to solve, not necessarily a problem, but just a project to do, it is going to take real time out of your schedule and you're the one that is the problem solver of that thing rather than the checker of the solution of the problem. You're going to devote more time to it, you're going to be decisively engaged in it, you're going to have your head down instead of up, is what I'm saying.
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> I think if your propensity is to do things that you know you can do well yourself simply because you think it's more important that those things be done than preparing others to do those things after you, if you think that, then I submit (especially in a military organization) your thinking is wrong. Because in no other organization are the members more "dispensable" than in ours.

Management Information

Under this heading we discussed with LTC Garven the processes of feedback and accountability, and some of the types of indicators that it is important for him to monitor for the purposes of managing training. The first type of information identified was that which comes from external inspections and evaluations.

> Well, the things that occur on a cyclic basis, the ARTEP, the AGI, the METT, the TVI's, the NATO site, those sorts of requirements which are all inspections, they're all inspections, pretty well keep me on track. . . . They are the indicators that commanders above me have to look at.

He went on to say that each one of those inspections is a test event which measures some type of performance and which gives the battalion a

recorded indication of their status in that area, and by inference, points up individual and collective strengths and weaknesses. Copies of the written report which stay in the battalion are often passed down the chain to the batteries, as appropriate, to inform affected personnel of where they need to concentrate their efforts.

On the subject of accountability: "There are fairly obvious ways to determine if goals are not achieved; and when that happens, we find out why and who was responsible. Again, we rely on the chain of command. A private may be able to make excuses, but his superior should know that he is accountable."

What other types of management information feeds into the training picture?

> I get the information on my personnel turnover from my S-1 and also from talking with my commanders about the new people they are getting in. That tells me I must have more individual training, that the new guys are new guys, and it tells me I've got to expect the batteries to do more section and battery training, whether they're new guys or not. SQT results. Always the last ARTEP evaluation and maybe maybe, in some cases, AGI evaluations. We have been doing so famously in the nuclear weapons business that I've been lulled into a state or sense of security though I know that's an ever present danager. I can look at the attrition of people in those specialized areas and get a pretty good feel for how much more I'm going to have to do in that area. Again I guess the results of the tests that are already set up are good indicators for me where I need to devote my training time and management time and then some strength figures.

The question was raised as to how higher headquarters judges the overall quality of a battalion, and what specific types of information they would monitor.

> Well, I can't speak for them but having worked at higher headquarters, if a unit does well in those major milestone events, it's going to get that sort of notoriety because a headquarters above them is going to come down and know about that. The AGI, even the ARTEP to some extent. Certainly the TVI certification, METTs. ORTPs, that sort of thing. If they do well in that area, and if they do well in meeting their suspenses, or whatever administrative queries are sent to them from above, then they are probably in the eyes of the higher headquarters going to be a "good unit." They are going to get a

black eye or a bad name if they have a lot of disciplinary problems, especially problems that will bring a lot of notoriety. Like soldiers who rape, soldiers who cause public disturbances, soldiers who drive while they are intoxicated or get caught and have accidents and high drug incidents. Those sorts of people, if the numbers are great enough, will bring certain discredit to the unit. . . . It's just like a public person has no private life. A battalion or a unit doesn't have a private life. It is always being scrutinized, but I think if you can be a pillar in the community as a battalion, do well on all of those big ratings, and meet your suspenses so your immediate higher headquarters doesn't get into trouble from their higher headquarters because of your inattention to detail and suspense, then you are going to be called a "good battalion."

LTC Garven spoke with some frustration about the seeming discrepancy between the stated mission and objectives from above and the way that units are actually judged.

If my battalion is not trained as I want them to be trained, to prepare themselves for the eventuality of war, there is no doubt in my military mind that I am going to die with them. Death in a very literal sense. However, if I don't maintain a certain overhead to insure that the suspenses for the reports that I have to submit to higher headquarters are met, and to in some way react, react to those unscheduled events like race riots down in Hertie's Square, or defamating situations against the citizenry, if I don't take care of that, in other words, rob from the training program my thinking time, my planning time, put out those grass fires, then in a very figurative sense I'm going to die too. Because I'm not going to be allowed to continue on with my battalion. I will be taken out and they'll put another guy in. So nobody says to me, "You are doing an unsatisfactory job because you are not trained." And yet that is my mission. They say to me instead, "Your incident rate is too high. You have missed too many suspenses. You are not maintaining your objectives for reenlistment." . . . I won't be relieved, replaced, let go early, undistinguished for not preparing my battalion to go to war and yet that will be the rhetoric of every commander who put me in command and every commander who keeps me in command. He will tell me that's my most important job.

Preparation for Command

The final topic pursued with LTC Garven had to do with pre-command and early command experiences. Under this heading three areas were touched on: LTC Garven's own background and preparation for command; his advice to others

approaching command; and the kinds of observations, decisions and actions that were taken shortly after assuming command.

LTC Garven first reviewed the positions he had previously held in field artillery units.

> I think it's important that you serve with troop units most of the time, and that you be no higher than the battalion level, most of the time, before you assume command at the battalion.
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> I did not command a battery. My "command credit" comes from my Infantry advisory time in Viet Nam. I have been a battalion S-2; I have been a battalion recon survey officer; I have been a battalion fire direction officer. I feel comfortable in the gunnery portion of the field artillery. I have been a battalion S-3; I have been a battalion executive officer. So I feel comfortable in the maintenance and mechanics, the materiel of a field artillery battalion. And a lot of that carries over from having been down in the battery too. . . . So you might say I've been a 1, I've been a 2, I've been a 3 and I've been a 4 in the sense that the executive officer sort of oversees logistics and maintenance. I've had all the staff jobs. My command, as far as artillery command, artillery materiel command, has been very limited. The job that helped me most to be a battalion commander was my job as the executive officer.
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> . . . . . .
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> You have to serve in a battery. I have never commanded a battery. I got my command time as an infantryman in Viet Nam. Not commanding, that wasn't the title, I was the advisor to two companies of Vietnamese, but while they were commanded by their own commander, they did what I said.

Then he recounted the deliberate steps that he took to get ready to take command.

> I started to remember every previous battalion commander I'd ever served for and things I liked and disliked about each one and I can see their faces right now, . . . eight battalion commanders that I worked for. Knew many others and considered some of them that came to mind that I've been close to or next door to and that sort of thing. But I started remembering first hand what was it that I really liked about this guy? What is a battalion commander? I started thinking about the second--I began to think about the big things that are important to a good artillery battalion--combat readiness, troop discipline and morale--and then I started pondering about the influence

a battalion commander has on these things, in other words, sort of trying to define what my role should be and then what it can be in terms of the big issues. You know, I'm the president of the corporation--what does the corporation stand for? Who are the stockholders--what is the labor force, etc.

. . . . . .

I enrolled in a series of correspondence subcourses on FA subjects and completed three of the eight I received. That was rather a knee jerk undertaking for me. I had not been in a field artillery battalion since 1973. So knowing that I would be going to take command in either 1979 or 1980, that would have meant that I was away seven years and I surmised that a few things may have changed so I subscribed to a sort of a handy-dandy, catch-you-up-quick-on-things-in-the-artillery series of subcourses and the state of the art of the subcourses hasn't changed very much. Some of the subjects are new, but the approaches are essentially the same. . . . The more I got into the subjects, the more I realized I hadn't forgotten that much about it. . . . And the subcourses weren't so technical that I was going to get any kind of detailed poop anyway, so it was just an act of good faith, but after three of the eight, I said to hell with it--I don't need this. I kept them and I look in them from time to time if I feel there is something in there that I could use, but it was not a very fruitful undertaking. It didn't prepare me. If I'd not done it at all, I wouldn't have been any the less prepared. Now that may not be the case for everyone, but then, as I said before, I've had enough jobs in field artillery that I have probably touched on all the subcourses I subscribed to--[through] first-hand experience.

And then, because he recognized the importance to the commander of being able to delegate responsibility for carrying out specific tasks, he began to practice this principle in his then current position.

And then I practiced on the organization that I was heading at the time by delegating many of the actions I had been doing myself before notification of my command selection. I was the straw boss, foreman, call it what you will, of the newly founded philosophy department [at West Point]. . . But anyway, I practiced on the people that I had. [also] I intensified my personal physical fitness regimen, not that I wasn't working out at West Point, but I picked up a little bit more on that. And, of course, I attended all the pre-command courses at Fort Sill, Leavenworth, Heidelberg, Vilseck, and a language course at Presidio. So, those are the things I did in the time that I had to prepare myself, I thought, for battalion command.

These are the things that I recall as being deliberate. I did a hell of a lot of soul searching to think on the business of starting to remember previous battalion commanders.

Question: Did you develop any particular strategies about the way you wanted to run the battalion during this period?

LTC Garven: Well, after I'd finished the pre-command series of courses, and I'd heard so much rhetoric--things you should do, things you ought to consider, and things you probably ought not to do--that pretty well convinced me that I wanted to use my Command Sergeant Major differently than I'd seen Command Sergeants Major [used elsewhere]. And I have because I have a good one. But I did decide that I was going to use the Command Sergeant Major to help me turn the running of the Army back to the NCO corps and take it out of the hands of commanders who are doing sergeants' business for them. And I don't think that was such a earth shattering decision but it was solidified after my pre-command course and experience of having heard what some officers had to say and also having heard what some Command Sergeants Major had to say.

In view of the fact that he had gone through the process fairly recently, LTC Garven was asked what guidance he would give to new selectees as they approach command.

First of all, I think they ought to do all of the above, that I did, plus or minus; . . . it may not be possible to have all the jobs that I have had. And yet, that's a very important part of preparation for being a battalion commander.

And then, I have reflected on this quite a bit, they should view the following motion pictures if they've never seen them before, and if they've seen them before, they should see them again: "From Here To Eternity," "The Caine Mutiny," and "Tunes of Glory." I'll tell you why I think this. "From Here To Eternity" depicts an Army, a situation in our Army which I submit is probably as close to our Army right now as it was then. It was an Army that was not ready to go to war, it was an Army peopled by people who either couldn't make it on the outside or were kind of left over from World War I and the Philippines. It was just another job. And it depicts a lot of the seamy sorts of problems that I see everyday so I think it's very real. It depicts an NCO corps that's certainly not lilly-white but probably stronger than the one we have now and it depicts an officer corps that was probably weaker than the one we have now and yet it has a certain perspective that I would like to see our Army come back to and that is that the NCOs were truly running the Army. I think it is an appropriate motion picture for these times.

"The Caine Mutiny" talks about a career Naval officer who was just mentally fatigued to the point of, under a stressful situation, probably incompetence. He had suffered through a peacetime Navy experience and through a wartime Navy experience and at a crucial point in a maneuver, not in combat environment, he cracked. And a bunch of hotshot temporary officers took his ship away from him and the character development of this individual Captain, I think is very illuminating for a man

who is about to become a commander. It causes a great deal of introspection if you're given to that sort of thing. And the last one has some similar values of how commanders should view themselves and what they should be very careful of. And this is a British film. But I think "Tunes of Glory" should be viewed at least once a year by every officer who has any serious intent about staying in the Army. I would like to get a hold of it and make it an officers' class. It's probably one of the most, in my view, for my profession, one of the most powerful movies I've ever seen. . . . But you have to see them with ideas in mind or you'd have to pick up on the things that I think I pick up on in those movies.

Question: Could you offer any advice in terms of how to decide what style of command is important to you or appropriate to you?

LTC Garven: I'd say don't be what you can't be. I think everyone, every human being should have the capacity to look at himself and see what he thinks his strengths are and capitalize on those and try to improve on his weaknesses, but you just can't once they say, "Okay, you're going to be a battalion commander," and once you are a battalion commander say, "Now, okay, this is the kind of guy that I've always wanted to be." You just can't do it--it just doesn't work. So you have to be yourself.

The discussion then turned to the early period of command and how a new battalion commander goes about determining the overall status and well-being of his unit.

Well, I'm still doing that. You look at the major indicators. ARTEPs, AGI, TVIs. If you're fortunate as I was to have a powerful first soldier [CSM], you talk to him. You, of course, talk to your most senior advisors, your XO and your commanders, and then you just look, you go around and look for yourself.

Question: Did you see early on that you had to formulate policies in certain areas?

LTC Garven: Yes. And primarily in the area of truly establishing a relationship with the Germans that we are to support and forcing the issue on GDP [General Defense Plan] which had generally been overlooked. . . . When I took command we generally didn't know what we were suppose to do--we knew what the classical definition of our mission was in terms of the people that we supported, in terms of their scheme and the defense of the sector, where we could be called upon to fire, I'm talking about actual locations on the ground: we had a mission, you know. Here we are a nuclear capable 8-inch battalion rolling out there, and we don't have anything to do--or we haven't been told what it is we're suppose to do.

Question: So, essentially, you forced that decision with the German headquarters?

LTC Garven: Yes, and with my own higher headquarters and when I couldn't get any help from my higher headquarters, I at least got their permission to start the initiatives myself. But, you know, that was the first thing that I saw I had to change the way that it had been going.

And there were some little things. I didn't like the PT program, so I changed it. . . . PT had gotten to be something you did if the weather was okay, or if the guy who made the decision was in your favor, and it was really a wishy-washy thing. So I came and said PT is good. We need to have it everyday, but we certainly don't run in the streets when there is ice in the streets, but you can do PT in the hallway. You can do it at the foot of your bed is what I'm talking about. It's physical time. Push-ups, sit-ups, side straddle hops in the halls, bending, stretching, reaching exercises, running in place, or if you are very careful you can run down the halls, up the stairs and around the top and down the back, but you have to be careful about that. There's good aerobic exercise in that. We will do that every day so that there is no longer a question about whether or not we are going to have PT. That's a fact; we are going to have it, but now whether we are going to have it inside and outside will still be a judgement, and battery commanders can make that judgement themselves. . . . But, you know every morning when you get up you are going to take PT. There's no more of the, "Oh God, I hope it's snowing today, God I hope it's raining today." Everybody gets up and does something. I checked that in the beginning and the weather had been so good after I initiated PT everyday [as] an indoor-outdoor thing, that after a while, even when the weather before would have cancelled PT, people elected to come outside and do it outside.

The issue was then raised as to whether there were some types of decisions or changes which are better deferred until the commander and his staff and subordinate commanders had gotten to know each other better.

I think that's probably true. In some issues. I think if you come on board and you find something that's just obviously wrong, or doesn't suit your personality at all, which is obviously born out of the personality of the previous commander and you don't change that, then I think you're making a mistake. And I think later on that sort of change would be difficult to do. Some things I think you've got time to look at, think them out and change them later on or maybe leave them like they are. But, I did not want to come into this battalion and have to make a lot of changes. I'd already been told it was a good battalion as it is and I was secretly hoping that I would find it so, that it wasn't all a facade, and I was not disappointed. There

were some things that I didn't like the way they were going and those are the things that I influenced early.

Question: Are there any specific types of decisions that may need to be deferred?

LTC Garven: I think anything that involves the moving about of people. . . . And I'm talking not so much of the key leaders; their jobs are pretty well explained. You don't find many of those people out of pocket. But I'm just talking about Indians. I continue to learn all sorts of things; there's a great deal of intrigue in the battalion. But I find out now why some people now are doing certain jobs--I'm talking about Spec 4s, maybe Spec 5s or E-5s--when, in fact, that's not their MOS and other people who have the MOS are doing something entirely different. "Now why isn't that guy over there doing what he's supposed to do?" And rather than just come in and say, "Okay, I want all MOSs aligned," I'm just coming to find out there are compelling reasons why you don't do that sometimes. But that takes a bit of watching and studying and asking.

Question: One final question. What is the hardest thing about being a battalion commander?

LTC Garven: Well, I don't know about all battalion commanders, but the hardest thing for me has been controlling myself about my own disappointments about the accomplishments of my unit. And I'm not talking about just the unit as a whole, I'm talking about individuals, I'm talking about myself. Being patient. Not having my expectations too high. That's the hardest thing for me. . . . This is the best job I have ever had, and I'm loving every minute of it, and I have to keep talking to myself about not expecting too much too soon. But knowing all along, we are working against the clock that we don't hold.

ARMOR BATTALION
LTC BENJAMIN COVINGTON

Philosophies

In talking about being a battalion commander and about managing training, LTC Covington speaks a great deal about the importance of thinking hard and caring about the business of combat readiness. The word "thinking" comes up again and again. Battalion commanders ". . . think, they think hard and they think all of the time." Everyone in the battalion is explicitly encouraged to think about better ways of doing things. Another recurrent theme is that every policy and everything that is done in the battalion ultimately interacts with everything else in affecting the overall combat effectiveness of the unit. Therefore, it is important to analyze all decisions and all activities in the minutest detail to determine that those impacts have a net positive effect.

Each of the three excerpts which follow exemplifies in some measure the above characterization of LTC Covington's philosophies.

> And when you start thinking about that [managing training], then you are talking about the entire spectrum of a battalion's policies. You're talking about every single thing that a battalion does, every method that is used whether it is how you feed people in the mess hall, how your work program works, how the processing of personnel actions takes place, how your guard and detail system is organized to work, because every single one of those things--and all the rest that haven't been mentioned--play a part in not only creating a general atmosphere professionally. But, far more importantly, every single one of them has a potential to add to or subtract from or be neutral with respect to the training mission of the battalion.
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> . . . . . .
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> I put emphasis on everything. I personally have carefully avoided being one of these kinds of people who considers himself to be a training guy or a maintenance guy or a logistics guy. I put the same degree of command emphasis on each one of those areas; show the same amount of

interest, talk to the people with the same degree of detail, look at what we're doing and try to figure out better ways to do it with the same degree of attention as any other place.

Because, now the reason, you know, that we're talking about training in this context and with regard to what I've just said is because the business of combat readiness, overall ability to fight, is the totality of the business of a maneuver battalion. It incorporates by necessity all of those areas. . . . If we don't have people that know the business of logistics, that don't know in peacetime particularly, how to handle money and make the most of it--how not to lose a dime. If we don't have a support platoon that is highly capable, knows it's business, and knows how to keep our vehicles fueled up, we're not going to do any of these things. If we don't have an S-1 who is constantly tuned to forecasting what our personnel difficulties will be, changes that we need to make way in advance so that it facilitates smooth transitions, recognizing our soldiers and seeing to it that we get those awards and decorations in and, more importantly, back out, . . . and all those things, then we are degrading our combat readiness in every one of those areas and many others.

You see, the thing is, I'm afraid that some people (at least) don't look at it quite that way. They tend to look at the S-1's business as being somehow isolated from the business of combat readiness training and it is not in the least bit isolated from the business of combat readiness training. It is integral to it. The difference in the way that you care for your soldiers, the extra steps that might be taken to assist people in personnel actions, the emphasis on trying to do something that we will never do as well as we should--properly recognizing our people for their accomplishments--is instrumental to the whole attitude and perspective of our soldiers. And therefore, it is part and parcel of combat readiness.

. . . . . .

But first and foremost, the biggest thing that can be done, of course, is to think about it. And to think about it you've got to care about it. You've got to care about the business of professionalism in the United States Army. And I mean really care. I'm not talking about care because everybody's supposed to care. I'm talking about really caring. And then, give it a lot of dedicated thought. The more you think about it, the more things crop up, the more options to choose from, and there's always one--there are always many ways to do anything, but of those many options, there is one which will lend itself the most positively to the continuum of combat readiness. All the others will be less productive.

To get to that one, . . . you've got to think of all the options. To do that you've got to think and then to select the one that will synchronize itself with what it is you're trying to do in the business of sustained combat readiness. You've got to think out what the subtleties of the impact of doing that thing in all these various ways might be.

The next excerpt deals in an abstract way with an idea that is very central to LTC Covington's approaches to training and training management. His premise is that training and learning can occur anywhere and any time, if the circumstances are properly adapted, and that many opportunities for training are overlooked because of rigid ways of looking at where and how training can be accomplished. This idea, along with some practical examples, is brought up again later under the subheading of training management techniques.

> What you hear over and over from people who talk about their training programs is we don't have enough time, or if we had the time we could do [such and such]. So if you think about that statement, it's got to lead you into saying "where is the time"? As soon as you say that, if you are really thinking about it, you've already got the answer because the question is not when is the time, but the question is where is the time, and that's precisely where time exists. It exists in places and not in some spacial concept that exists independent of palpable reality. That's the key. Then once you say that, you say where are the places. . . . But the places are where people are located. And then you say where are people located and you discover all kinds of places where people are located, which are places that are not normally thought of, because we don't think nearly deeply enough about any of this business usually, as being places that have anything to do with training. Consequently, without even giving it any thought, we give away huge chunks of time that could be effectively used with no loss in anything, no big program or anything like that; not if you make it a way of life, which is what it has to be.
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> We give all of that away and what we're really looking at when we say there is not enough time are very small, prescribed blocks of time which are what's left after you've deleted all the other time. Then you act as though that was the only time that existed, and then you plug in trying to get a job done, or trying to get some "thing" done into that time only, which is to say, you are looking at the moon as if the only part of the moon that existed was the part you can see, when in fact, the larger part of the moon you can't see. But it's there.

In the next group of extracts we see how LTC Covington looks upon the soldiers in his battalion and enourages others to regard them as well. This perspective will be developed even further under the heading "Leadership". The first statement to follow comes out of an inquiry as to whether

the new soldiers coming into the unit have the capabilities to deal with the sophistication of the current weapon systems. This latter question is an issue which has been raised frequently by persons and studies concerned with force manning.

> You can talk to any of my commanders and any of my non-commissioned officers. I believe that 99% of them will tell you--I know they will--because they tell me that same thing; just what I'm going to tell you. That is baloney. We consider our soldiers to be outstanding. Our non-commissioned officers are outstanding. We've got outstanding officers. They're the best that I've ever seen.
>
> Question: How about the new guys?
>
> I'm talking about the new guys, privates coming in. I have sergeants tell me every day, "Boy, these new privates that are coming in are great. We're really getting some good soldiers in." Why do they say that? Because that's the way we think about our soldiers. We choose to believe that our soldiers are damn good, from the day they walk in and to the extent that they aren't, that's our responsibility. We have the capability and space to see to it that they are helped.

The next two excerpts are taken from an earlier interview, but they express some of the same notions about the power of positive thinking and about the unit's responsibility to do all it can to develop the potential in each soldier.

> There's always a way. I guarantee you that I can teach all of the basic things that will keep a guy alive on a battlefield, to include his job on a tank. If you give me a guy who has never learned a word in his life I can do that, it can be done. But it can only be done by the people who care and think about the business of training and recognize that every guy is a little different, every guy is coming from a different direction and then gear his approach to that. What we tell our non-commissioned officers over and over and over again, the technique doesn't mean a damn bit of difference; none, zero. There is no guaranteed technique; technique is irrelevant in terms of whether it should be X or Y, what is relevant is whether information and skills are effectively generated in the guy with whom you are dealing.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Will he be as good tomorrow as he will be six months from now? No. The point is we have got to make him as good as we can and the biggest part of that has to do with attitude and perception of himself and his position, his responsibility and the point of what he's doing. That's the biggest part of it.

In the next section dealing with philosophies about leadership and the ways that leadership is used and expressed, we will see more about how soldiers' positive attitudes about their jobs are fostered.

Leadership

Under this heading a number of statements will be presented which disclose some of LTC Covington's beliefs on the roles and responsibility of leaders and other comments which show how he exemplified these beliefs in his own leadership role.

The prompting question was, "Where do the lowest level people get their inspiration?"

> They get it from us, from the chain of command. And where does the chain of command get it? It all has to start with the battalion commander. Any way you hack it, it's got to start with the battalion commander. It must. Non-commissioned officers cannot operate as professionals unless the battalion commander sees to it that they are able to.

And how does he go about conveying his belief that the job of every soldier is important and the business of learning to fight and stay alive is for real? He talks to them.

> Another thing I do with new soldiers is, of course, I talk to all new soldiers. What we tell them are some very fundamental simple things that every soldier ought to know but I think, there again, saying things is very, very important and there are a lot of things that cannot be said too often. The fundamental things we say to our soldiers are this--every soldier in this battalion owns a piece of this battalion. The piece that he owns is 1/623d because we are authorized 623 people. That includes the Battalion Commander, my share is as big as every privates' and it is not one bit bigger. I don't own the battalion, I am a member of it; I am his commander, he's a member of it; he is a tank driver or whatever his job happens to be and his job is just as important as mine is, and his share in the battalion is just as big as mine is, and his interest in the ability of the battalion is just as big as mine is, and that's where we want it to be. Every soldier is a professional soldier. We are going to view our soldiers as professional soldiers, we intend to look at them and treat them as professional soldiers, we want them to be professional soldiers, we want them to look at themselves as professional soldiers and we tell them that. Then we try to do all kinds of things to make it true. Because we want him to be a professional. Now, we are not saying he has to stay in the Army or anything like that, you don't have to. Being a professional is one thing, being a career soldier or a professional over a long term is another thing. We are not suggesting that he has to do that, we are suggesting that every guy can take a great deal of pride in being a

professional and we want him to have the opportunity to do that. So that's the kind of thing we tell them and then the last and I guess the most important is that the business of this battalion is to kill enemy tanks, and armored vehicles and people. It's just that simple. Tank battalions do not exist for any other reason and there is no need for anybody to kid anybody about it. We are here for a specific reason, we are not here just because they tried to find a place to put a tank battalion. There is a reason that we are here and we are what we are for a specific reason and there should never be any doubt about that. An individual has got a responsibility because of that to do the things that they must do well, WELL, the first time in battle, because there will be no more training, there will be no checking it out in the Field Manual, or any other damn thing when the guns start shooting. That guy has a personal responsibility and I talk to him of what that responsibility is and then who's going to be helping him and how they are going to be helping him and what resources are available to him so he can get better at it and the fact that you cannot get too good at it. It is not possible to get too good at this business.

And at another point, LTC Covington said:

I make a conscious effort to see to it that at least some time during each day, and I must say I didn't always succeed even so, that at least some time each day I was out talking to soldiers, either in training or down on the motor pool or walking on the street, or whatever it might be. . . . So, I have always made a conscientious effort to see to it that when I was out with my soldiers, whether it was at training or just outdoors anywhere, from the time I walked out of the door of battalion headquarters until the time I walked back in, even if I was just walking to the brigade headquarters, surely I would bump into one or two soldiers from my battalion that I could shoot the breeze with, "What are you doing today," and you know, things like that. But I made myself visible, and I talked to people about the business of professionalism. So that was one guideline I gave myself. You must do that. I tried to do that.

And when he talks to soldiers about professionalism, what kinds of things does he tell them?

Now, to get soldiers to think about the business of professionalism, about their responsibilities, about what all this really means, you have to tell them that's what you want them to do. Over and over again. Because there is an old syndrome that's as old as complaining about the chow in the mess hall that everybody seems to automatically inherit from the day they're born somehow, or they hear things or read funny books, or whatever it is, and then in some cases it's reinforced when a guy goes through AIT or BCT, either through his perceptions or perhaps in actuality, that "Hey buddy--you are not being paid to think. You're being paid to turn that screw. You just keep turning it until it gets tight. When I tell

you to stop you can stop turning it and then I'll tell you what to do next, see? So don't be giving me a lot of ideas or reasons why there's another way to do it."

Now, there is a general perception on the part of a lot of young soldiers that that's the way the Army thinks about things, that's what the Army thinks. So, I make a special point of trying to wipe that out from the day a guy walks in. Every two weeks or so I get together with all the new soldiers that come in and I talk to them. One of the first things I say is you may think or may have the impression that in the United States Army you are not paid to think or use your imagination, but I want to tell you right here that that is false. In this battalion that's exactly what we expect you to do, that's what we want you to do. You can't do it enough. We want your thoughts, we want your initiative, we want your imagination, because out there in that group there are some great ideas that will improve the quality of life for our soldiers and the quality of our combat readiness, great ideas that we have not thought out. They're just up in the sky and somebody's going to snatch them, and it may be you and we want that idea. If you come up with a good idea and we don't use it, don't get your feelings hurt. There are lots of reasons why a really good idea can't be used sometimes. Because the next one may be the one that will make the difference. So you keep thinking all the time. That's what we want you to do.

In addition, LTC Covington talks to his NCO's about the same sorts of things.

I get together with the NCO's about every three or four months. Normally the Command Sergeant Major has a meeting, you know, and then I get invited, but of course, I ask to be invited. Why? So that we can talk, so that I can talk about the business of training and how to go about it and what are some of the things that we don't want to do because they, on the surface appear to be okay but in fact tend to undermine training effectiveness. I also talk about leadership.

Those are the two subjects. Always. And what do I say? Over and over again I say the same things, the same things always, because we can't think too much about those things. We can't talk about them too much. And that's the way that the battalion commander can assist in making the things that are important a way of life.

But then, of course, I talk about exactly the same thing when I shoot the breeze with a non-commissioned officer out on a tank in the sand dunes or wherever it may be. We always talk about the same things over and over again while we are trying to think of even better ways of doing this thing. What is a better way? And that's another thing I tell these guys. Now when you talk about a good idea, here's the kind of idea we're looking for. We're not looking for the guy who, when given the task of moving battalion headquarters says, "I found a solution. We get 10,000 soldiers to pick it up and carry it across the street." That's not a good idea. Any fourth grader can think of something like that. But the guy who comes in and says I've figured

out how to do it with one man, that's a good idea. That's the kind of idea we're looking for.

Another thing that LTC Covington discussed which reveals a characteristic of leadership is the importance of showing that he means what he says. He talks about that using the example of preparation for the Annual General Inspection.

> Because everytime you say something, the next thing you gotta say is, in what way can I demonstrate that I mean that, and you've got to do those things. There's many of them that you can figure out to demonstrate that this is not talk, this is not philosophy, this is not concept. This is reality. This is in fact the way we want to do business.
>
> When we had our first AGI, I called all the non-commissioned officers together and I said this is your AGI. There will be no formal, large-scale battalion inspections to see how companies are doing. We will have a couple of minor programs that are designed to assist, we are going to bring some people in from the outside to ask them to look at some things for us so that we can get another bird's-eye view, but as far as a battalion mobilized where the AGI is concerned, we're not doing it. Because most of the things looked at in an AGI are the business, year round, of the non-commissioned officer corps. Therefore, it's your AGI. If we do extremely well, it is to your credit; if we fall on our face, it's your responsibility. I will not step in and do anything to usurp your responsibility even if it means failing the AGI. And that's all I have to say about it. Do not expect me in the billets to walk around and take a look at them, and I didn't get close to any of my billets for two months on purpose.
>
> Well, needless to say, and I think this would be true anywhere if you mean it, and if you prove that you mean it, and if you're supportive of that kind of a notion, they do beautifully.

And then the final quotation under this heading represents a summary statement of LTC Covington's view of his leadership role.

> Who is responsible for the lives of the soldiers in that battalion? I am. Nobody else. I will not share that responsibility with anybody, and I will not be allowed to share that responsibility with anybody, and even if I was willing to do so and other people were willing to let me, it doesn't make any difference because it is my responsibility anyway.

Approaches to Training Management

Roles

With respect to training management, we will initially look at how certain roles and interrelationships among positions are defined. This first extract talks about the job of mission analysis and prioritizing tasks for training and the second deals with the planning and execution of training. While outlining certain roles these discourses also disclose important aspects of training management policy.

> What I did was to take a look at the ARTEP. I looked at all the tasks that a battalion must do and a company must do as a company. Then I said, based on our war plans and based on the things that I feel are the most critical to us, here is my--here are all of those things in the order of priority in which I place them, okay? And then I gave that to the company commanders and said this is the priority at battalion level. Now. Knowing that, you will have to establish priorities which sometimes will match this and sometimes be different from this based on your analysis at company level. And what will those priorities be? That's up to you. You are the guy who trains your company. The company commander must train his company, and what must the battalion commander do? He must see to it that he is allowed to train his company; he must support him in training his company. He must give him the guidance that is both good and solid and understandable, and non-restrictive simultaneously, that will allow him to proceed in the business of training in a way that gives him flexibility and yet keeps the emphasis on the kinds of things that we want to be able to do and must be able to do well.
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> . . . . . .
>
> The job of training soldiers is the company commander's job. The execution of the business of training soldiers is to be done at company level and nowhere else. So, what is the battalion's job? The battalion's job is to see to it, in every way imaginable, that the company commander can do that. And most units I have been in--what I have seen is, for example, an S-3 who tends to be directive in nature. The S-3 puts out this guidance, that guidance and the other guidance. In essence he is telling company commanders what they will do. That is 180 degrees out and wrong. The S-3 in this battalion has as his stated mission and understands it perfectly and executes it well, the mission of supporting company commanders and in that sense, he is in a subordinate position to the company commanders. But they don't think he is subordinate at all because he is an outstanding Major and that is not a problem; but he is in a supporting role and not in any directing role. So what does he do? They tell him what training they want to conduct, how they want to conduct it, and where they want to conduct it, and how they want to conduct it and he knocks himself out to see to it that they have the facilities to do it the way they want to do it. So, if anybody gets an ulcer, it is the S-3's job to get the ulcer and to see to it that they have what they need to train well. Then the company commander's job is to see to it that the

training is done well, the execution phase. Now, that may sound simple and everybody might say, yeah, that's right, but I will guarantee you that in the U.S. Army in the last 30 years, that is not the way it has worked. I guarantee you that if you go around that you will find that it doesn't work that way in most units, even now. There is another thing that the S-3 does, there are many things he does; he is the time-master of the battalion; put it like this, the S-3 owns the battalion's time. Now, he doesn't own it to use it anyway he wants to, but he is responsible to me for seeing to it, that it is used well. How does he do that? That means anybody who has anything that is going to use soldier's time, has got to coordinate it through that one single focal point right there, so there is no overlap of competing requirements and so on and so forth. Who decides where those times will be applied against our soldiers? The S-3. And how does he decide it? He decides it based on the desires of me and my commanders. And who makes the adjustment? Is it a company commander? Does he say, "Well, let me tell you, if you can't arrange that then I will have to do it next week"? Nope, wrong, it is the S-3 and he sees to it that he can arrange it and he does something that he was going to do next week, this week instead, not the company.

The next two statements deal with the training role of the NCO's and the delineation of responsibilities for training between officers and NCO's. These are taken from a training management handbook that LTC Covington developed for his staff and company commanders. The handbook itself will be discussed later along with other management techniques.

The first line NCO is the pivot point in Army training. In order to train well he needs three things (1) Personal expertise. (2) Training ability. (3) General direction. He gets the first from his own application and assistance from the next senior NCO's; the second from his senior NCO's and the third from his officer chain of command and his own analysis of his soldiers.

Officers have many jobs and managing training is one of them (see FM 21-6 and TC 21-5-7) but personally training individual soldiers. with few exceptions, is not one of them - that is an NCO duty and NCO's who do not do it well are not doing their job well. We must insure that our NCO's know this and that we do not act as though this is what we have always been doing - it is not, - what we have always been doing is taking training out of our NCO's hand and assuming it as an officer function.

* * * *

The best trained units are and always will be those trained by their NCO's. In order to create this environment, I want NCO's evaluated largely on the demonstrated capabilities of their subordinates. Every first line supervisor should be able to tell anyone the exact training status of each man assigned to him by SQT task and the status of his crew/section by ARTEP T&EO. Obviously he must know what these tasks and T&EO's are in order to do this.

Additional light will be shed on the roles and expectations for NCO's in interview extracts selected for subsequent topics.

Management Techniques

Under this heading we will look at some of the specific practices that were used in the battalion to organize various activities in a way that was intended to enhance the unit's overall combat readiness. The first of these is a lengthy and detailed description of the way guard and detail support requirements were fulfilled. This shows the analysis that went into organizing this activity in a way that could minimize the time that was given to the support requirements while still gaining some learning opportunities from that time. This discourse was used by LTC Covington to illustrate his point that every policy and practice in the battalion has a potential to add to or subtract from the training mission of the battalion.

> For example, there are umpteen ways to run a guard detail [so] that of all of the viable alternatives there will be one that maximizes the training time available to your soldiers and conversly that minimizes the loss of training time. Consequently, the method that you use in doing that should be a well thought out conscientiously selected method which is designed to do precisely that, to maximize training time, minimize loss of training time and to even go to the extent of using some of the time on guard and detail for training as well. All of that can be done and when it is done, then you are starting on the road to effectively training a unit. And until such time as you look at it as a comprehensive spectrum of every single thing that a battalion does that plays a meaningful role in this business, then you will never, ever, get the leverage that it requires to achieve quality sustainment training professionally. And that is a key point . . . that I think a lot of people don't understand and are not giving a whole lot of thought to. None of that will be found in [TC] 21-5-7 to any extent. Let me give you something even more specific, and I'm not saying there won't be a better way that we haven't thought of on how to do this and if there is we will keep thinking about it and try and find out. Guard and detail as an example, when I arrived here at this post the guard was a brigade guard.

Each battalion was tagged for X number of people. Brigade guard mount [was] held at 1600 or 1630 on each afternoon. After the mount inspection the guards went to a brigade guard house, and they pulled guard that evening and all the next day. Under a system like that, right away the first thing that happens is that if the guy is going on guard he must do certain things, he must be reasonably sharp, certainly a whole lot sharper than he would have to be if he worked in the motor pool. And that means you have to give him some time off to prepare for guard. What time off do you give him, the time off he gets to prepare for guard at 1600, is clearly not, cannot be the morning before, it's got to be just before he goes on guard mount; otherwise he will get all dirty again. Around 1300, 1400, or 1500 if you are really being tough, that guy is released. Now you have lost probably one and a half days x 15 [men]. That's 15 days plus 7 that's 22 man days involved there in the guard pool. They only have to change one thing to save one-third of that time and it's a simple thing. Have guard mount first thing in the morning. Guys prepare for guard the night before, on off-duty time. Doesn't cost him anything and it doesn't cost you anything. Guy is going on guard, it's no big hassle to stay home that one night and shine his shoes and all. And you have guard mount at 7 o'clock in the morning. The guards go on all that day, they're on that night, the next day they are off again and do they get a half day off? The same old deal? No, they do not. Absolutely not. Is there any need for them to? Absolutely not, but there is a myth in the Army because we have kind of always done it that way, that somehow guards need to have a lot of time off after pulling guard. If you analyze it you find out that, in fact, every guard can get about the same amount of sleep everybody else does. If you run the system right, then there is no reason for that guy to take a half day off let alone a whole day off. No reason at all and all you have to do is do it. Right there you have saved about one platoon's worth of soldier training time in a period of a week at least. You can go a lot further than that, that's just the beginning of it. Nine times out of 10 if you have 15 guys on guard like I do for example, every situation is a little different and you take a look at the situation and modify it accordingly. We have a requirement for 15 guards per day and sometimes we have a requirement for more than that when we are guarding the . . . [community munitions holding area], it will be another 10 or 25 per day. Once you get down to what we are guarding, in our case, the motor pool, you find that it is really only necessary to have two of those guys on duty at any one time during the daylight hours and five of them during evening hours. Now if you sit down and print out what the maximum efficient times are that a guy would be on guard and when the breaks should come looking at the situation between shifts, you discover that the 15 guys, minus 2 or possibly 4, all day long during daylight hours can be involved in training and maintenance in the motor pool with their platoons. They come from the guard and detail company. That company won't be in the field, they will be in the motor pool. Then you've got that far and then you say how do we make it work? How do we emphasize it? One of the things we do is that on guard mount

every single guy must carry a Soldier's Manual. That is an inspectable item. He brings it with him, and if you go down to the guard room, you will find training aids. On board all the tanks in the motor pool you will find training packages, designed to see to it that if there is even one guy on the tank, all he has to do is pull that baby out and he has all kinds of training material right there pertaining to ARTEP, his SQT, and his MOS and a lot of things about the tank and about tank crew functions. So, it is all there, ready and available. Now, you have not only saved all of the training time that comes from running the guard mount at certain times instead of other times, specifically starting in the mornings. You have then picked up a good deal of the time that is involved in times left on guard as training time, effective time, so you have gone then and if you want to work it out on a piece of paper, you will discover that over a period of say a month, you will be absolutely flabergasted at the amount of time that you have put back into training and what has it cost you? It hasn't cost a thing. Not one single thing, except thought, the only thing that it has cost. Now at first, of course, you will get people saying, just because they haven't done it that way, that this is a bad deal and so forth; but it isn't. The fact of the matter is, unless it's not explained to soldiers, that 99% of them even agree that by doing it that way what happens is that it has a positive effect on the soldiers just in a personal way and not having anything to do with the military. There are lots of things to be done and need to be accomplished in order to have a ready unit. Those things that have to be done regardless of when they are done and when do all of these things wind up getting done? Sometimes on the weekend, late in the evening and using a system like this, what happens? There are a lot of things that happen that don't have to happen on the weekends or the evenings, . . . during what I consider to be a legitimately--except under certain circumstances--personal time. In fact, we get even more done if we are doing it right than we would if we were using those weekends as well and those late hours in the evenings. So, you get a positive effect all the way around and that is just in one small area, the guard and detail.

Now, you have to go a lot further than that in the guard and detail business. The next thing you do is say, how do we do this? There are an infinite number of variations and possibilities there; the principle should be this and that is what it is in this battalion. The entire guard and detail commitment, regardless of what it is must be pulled by one company and one company alone with not one single extra man. In this battalion in order to emphasize this, command emphasis, not one single man from any other company outside of the guard and detail company may be pulled to assist in any guard and detail or other administrative requirement without my personal consent. Nobody, the Sergeant Major, the XO, nobody, has the authority to ask for one single guy in a company that is not in the guard and detail company for that day, and I can tell you that I have not once given my permission yet in the two years and that it is

possible. There are a lot of people that will tell you that it can't possibly be done that way. That's bull. There may be a few places where it can't be done, and in those places that is what has to be examined and that becomes a brigade and community commander's responsibility. There is a level of commitments that are placed against those units to begin with and I can guarantee you that in every case it will be an unacceptable and unnecessary level in which there is a lot of . . . stuff going on that could be wiped out reducing it down to the point where no single battalion ever has to be committed more than, at the most, one full company on any given day. Now, what that means, of course, is that every other company is free to do its business, totally free, and it means that for the first time in the life of many people in that company, they can go out to a morning formation and actually see everyone in that company, unless some guy is on leave in that company, standing there, and not only that, even more importantly and more unique, march off to the day's business of training or whatever the day's business might be with all of them. A reality, and it does happen and has happened here for two years and it can happen anywhere. Wherever it can't happen because of overburdening commitments, you are going to find that all that has to be done there is to examine rationally and professionally the level of commitments that are coming down from the next higher headquarters and they can be reduced, inevitably, every time with no exceptions. . . . Now, the next thing you have to ask is how long should a company be on guard detail, one week, two days, three days, how often? The conclusion that we came to, and by the way, in this book [TC] 21-5-7 you will find something called the X-Y-Z concept. Now you are going to find in a lot of places where people have read that and they say, "the X-Y-Z concept, you have to implement that concept, the book says so and so it's got to be good," so they go in there and try to do it exactly the way one little example indicates. That is not the idea. They don't understand, they haven't gotten the message. The message is that you need to organize things in a way which guarantees the maximum number of soldiers are in training and you organize your administrative requirements in a way that allows for that, and blocks that can be meaningful, and that is all that it means. Now whether it is X-Y-Z or XY or ZX, now whether we are doing it at battalion level or brigade level or what have you, is not what is relevant, what is relevant is just the fundamental notion. . . . So, our guard and detail company each pull one three-day and one four-day guard and detail period per month. Why not a seven-day? Because, it is too long. . . . In addition to that, there are many things that happen over a week; let's say that some inspection team is coming in for a week. . . . By seeing to it that there isn't any full week in which any one company isn't involved exclusively in guard detail, no matter what happens in a period of one week, all companies are available to participate in it. In addition to that, it insures . . . that the guys in [that] company are free on at least one weekend day at least every single weekend, as opposed to having three weekends when they are free and one when they have no weekend, . . . because they are on guard duty. So, they get a weekend day, Thursday, Friday and

Saturday and two weekdays and then there is a weekend day and three weekdays which they are involved in. There is no company in which a guy doesn't get one of those weekend days. That is another advantage. Now, you are not going to find that level of thought in TC-21-5-7, and you are not going to find it anywhere else in writing, and maybe there is no need for it, and then again, maybe it would be worthwhile.

The next discussion resumes the theme presented earlier that time is where people are, or more explicitly, that available time is where soldiers are available, and that training opportunities are underutilized when this fact is not recognized. This notion is akin to, but goes beyond, the concept sometimes referred to as "training in the cracks". The latter refers to the use of mini-lessons by NCO's to instruct one or several soldiers in some subject during dead times in scheduled training exercises. In the excerpt which follows, LTC Covington first talks about the limitations that are unwittingly placed on training by overdefining what training is. The obverse of this is that by expanding the definition of, and perspectives on, what training can be, additional opportunites for training open up. This discussion leads to examples of how this broader concept of training can be put into practice.

Where is time? When you ask that question, right away you are saying that this time is located somewhere and that is exactly right. Time is located in space, it exists in places, and the places that the time exists is places where soldiers are, or where you put them. And there is lots of it to be had. There is none of it to be had, however, if you view training as a situation that requires certain kinds of things. The minute you put requirements on training, if those requirements do not exist at a given point, you are saying, the training, therefore, does not exist, and cannot exist at that point in any satisfactory way. Let us say, for example, that you have a notion, even if you haven't articulated it, that after 20 years experience in the Army, or 18, or whatever the hell it might be, that to effectively train people, you've got to have a certain number of people, you've got to have an instructor of some kind, you've got to have them together for a certain amount of time. Now right away, you have put three unnecessary constraints on the notion of training, and if you believe that, you will also believe that whenever you do not have an instructor, and do not have a certain number of people, and do not have a certain amount of time when they are all gathered together standing there and looking at this guy, that you cannot train or that you cannot train

effectively, and you have tied a rope around yourself, and for nothing. The fact of the matter is, there are only two things that are required, maybe three, let's say there are three things that are required, but they are three different kinds of things than that notion suggests. It requires one NCO, one soldier and five minutes time, in the same place and that is all, that is all that is required to impart a piece of knowledge that is necessary for somebody to have, or to check on somebody's ability with respect to that piece of knowledge. . . . and if we are thinking like that, suddenly we discover hundreds of effective training hours everywhere we look and we use them. But, if we are not thinking like that, we don't see them, we don't use them and it doesn't happen and there is a hell of a big difference. Now, you have to go a lot further than that, again, that is just the first level of thinking about that sort of thing. Now you say fine, where are some places we can find time and use it effectively and how and what are the methods of using time effectively? What are the methods of using time effectively to your advantage at least? Well, where do soldiers tend to gather? Mess lines? Well, there are a lot of people in mess lines, lots of people in mess lines, standing there doing nothing. How do we take advantage of that? There are a lot of ways to take advantage of that. Will it hold the mess line up? No. Do they hassle anybody? No. Does it create a problem for anybody? No. What does it require? A little thought. For example: There is a mess line that goes through a hallway, you go to that hallway and you say fine, what can we put in this hallway, that people will keep looking at so much that it becomes ingrained in them? What are some of the things, in this case, that would probably tend to be rapidly diminishing items of information, silhouettes of enemy vehicles, call for fire format, use of the compass, lots of things and you can select the ones that by experience tend to be diminishing and by the nature of the mission and the things you want a soldier to do well have a high priority and you can put them up on that wall and that's your training. Will people look at them? You are damn right they will look at them. Anybody who thinks they won't is crazy, because they are going to look at that wall anyway. Now, the only difference is that they are looking at that wall and it has something on it that is of essence to their business and even if they try to look away from it, they will look at something else and I will guarantee you that a lot of that will be absorbed. So, what have you gained, you have gained something out of that mess line that costs you absolutely nothing, the guys are there anyway and the walls are there anyway, the time is there anyway, and the only thing that you have done is take advantage of it by recognizing that it exists. . . . There is another place, in the break areas, in the maintenance area and then you go one step further than that. Wherever you can, you try to key the things that you put there to the kinds of things that the guys who are there are likely to be involved in at that time. For example, in the motor pool where you've got a break area, what would you put up there? Well, why not put up things that have to do with maintenance? Maintenance is training, training is maintenance. Everything, virtually is training if you look at it that way. It is all in the difference of how you look at it. In the guard room, what sorts of things do you put there? Things that pertain to the business of security, CEOI and that sort of thing, that are related in some way, however subtle, to what is going on there at that

time, as well as general things. Now that we have started doing those kinds of things, you are starting to pick up all kinds of things that most people would view as non-existent time. Time that is not available, time that is being used to do something else, time that should not be counted as training time, when in fact it can be, with some thought. The whole business of maintenance, in a tank battalion in particular, there are other battalions where maintenance is very high intensity, certainly a tank battalion is one of high intensity maintenance [units] due to the nature of the equipment. It is big, it is fairly complex, there are lots of pieces on a tank, lots of parts, and it's hard work, very hard work. It is physical, demanding labor, and anybody who has not broken a track on a tank, may not understand that. . . . Now, how do we get an advantage out of that if the guys breaking a track? If the NCO who is there is thinking in terms of training, he is going to be talking all the time, and what is he going to be talking about? He is going to be talking about maintaining the tank. As that guy works breaking the track, he is going to be teaching him about how to break the track better, how to make sure he doesn't break any tools, how to take care of things, how to make sure he is accounting for the tools that he is using and a wide variety of other things that are of the essence in the business of professionally going about the Army's business. He will be training, but if he doesn't think that way, he will be standing there supervising the turning of nuts, bolts, and screws, and he will have lost all of that time that he could have been very, very effective, if he understood that it was possible to do that.

The third practice in the area of training management is a little different in nature, and incorporates aspects of training program evaluation, planning, and professional development.

Twice a year, or three times a year, we have a four-day training management seminar, in which we bring in our senior NCO's, we sit down and we do a number of things. The fundamental thing about which the seminar is focalized, is that we require that every single first-line NCO, with his platoon sergeant and his platoon leader, together in detail, [evaluate] each one of his soldiers, with respect to each task in the Soldier's Manual, and, his group of soldiers with respect to those tasks those soldiers must all perform well as a group, squad, tank crew or whatever it is. Then the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant after receiving those briefings, add to that those things that the platoon must do well as a platoon, and they brief their company commanders and 1SG's on what they have been briefed on, and what those things that they have to add to that. Then the company commander presents to me and the XO, and the CSM, the comprehensive briefing on status of training strengths and weaknesses and so on throughout his company and includes those things that a company must be able to do well as a company which is to say essentially, the ARTEP tasks you find at company level, although there are other things besides. . . . Now we go through that

process about twice a year, sometimes three times and it only takes about three or four days and it is more than worth it. Other things we do, we usually have a general officer come on over and open the discussion and talk to us, the commanding general perhaps or maybe the chief of staff, the G-3 of the division, or the community commander, to highlight the significance or importance of it. We bring in, we select those areas in which we feel we need to know more, where we have lost some of the knowledge we had where it is necessary for us to know as leaders or maybe there are some new things that have come up in the field of doctrine and we have a series of speakers who come and talk of that specifically in carefully selected subjects. Then, we break our NCO's down into seminars and they spend about a half a day, going over very carefully selected subjects that are of interest and concern to us and feed back to us their views and notions about how we can improve in those areas and what things we ought to do and think about and what we ought not to do and what is worthwhile and not worthwhile and where we have to change the policy. Now, what we do there, of course, is that every single time we want to do "x", we delete "y", there is no such thing as building up, now we are doing this, let's do this also, uh, uh, you don't get anywhere that way. If there is something better to be done, then we want to substitute [for] something that is less effective and do that instead. We look for solutions, this has to be verbalized, all of these kinds of things have to be verbalized or people won't understand them. . . . So, now, that is an aspect of the whole feedback business.

And finally under this heading of management techniques, we will look at a management tool developed within the battalion to facilitate training management and planning. The tool is the training management handbook alluded to earlier.

> . . . each one of the company commanders has a training management book that we have developed for him, designed to assist him in continually evaluating, re-evaluating, prioritizing and re-prioritizing his responsibility to see to it that that company is well-trained. That is the execution portion of training that company. And in there we have a wide variety of things, most of which are designed to give him, right on his desk, certain kinds of information that he won't have to go and look up or waste any time getting, like data on mileage to certain places, sizes of training areas, what can be done there and what cannot, what the restrictions are. And he can flip over there if he doesn't remember and he has decided to do something and he can say, yeah, I can do that here, but I can't do that here, so that is where we want to go, and he can call the S-3 up and say arrange it.

In order to present a more complete picture of the nature of this handbook, the Table of Contents and Tab B entitled "Commander's Training Guidance and Policies" are reproduced in the Appendix to this report.

Evaluation of Training

Under this heading, a number of ideas and practices are drawn together which deal with measuring individual and unit performance, determining whether training has been effective, responsibility for evaluation, and so on. Certainly one important evaluation and feedback process is embodied in the biannual training management seminars already discussed. The next several excerpts deal with the actual observation and evaluation of performance.

> Now, how do you go about seeing how well the business of training is being executed, in fact? Again, my S-3 goes out and looks at training and we talk about training, but the principal guy who looks at training is me. The principal guy who stands out there and watches and talks to NCO's about the details and about the ways they are discoursing with their soldiers and getting feedback and so on, and checking out to find out if a guy really knows how to do something or is just shaking his head and saying, yes, I understand, is me, and talks to company commanders about the business of training and about the fine points about the kinds of things that must be a part of every single aspect of training that we execute, that he executes. That is me and that is my job, because I am the guy who is responsible for that. Any commander, in my view, who turns that responsibility over to his S-3, doesn't understand what his responsibilities are and has just a very vague general notion of just what staffs tend to be generally responsible for. Because none of the staff is sectioned--only a piece of pie--they are the point of contact to see to it that the battalion is well served in certain areas, that is what their job is.

* * * * *

> Now, we do not use a large number of highly bureaucratic, administrative testing procedures. If you go beyond a certain very well thought out point in doing that, you are eating up time unproductively, you are cutting down on effective training time. You are losing out. You are degrading training instead of increasing it. Even though, to the novice, or I consider anybody who doesn't think deeply about this business of being a novice, irregardless of how old they are or of how many years of service they have, and of what rank they are, it can appear that all those charts, bar-graphs, lanes of questionnaires and tests are a substitute for actual knowledge. But, I have had a lot of people who want to do more testing and I don't want to do it. I don't even like the word testing myself. I prefer command emphasis I think.

An important feature of the testing that is used in the battalion is what they refer to as "no fail testing."

A major principle of all testing, of any kind, in this battalion, is to [have] no such thing as failing a test. Now, let me explain that since it is not totally true. Our testing is what we call "no fail testing". . . . and it is this: A soldier is being examined, tested or what have you, on his ability to do something. Now let us say that that soldier does it perfectly. Then that is great and the records that we keep on that, which is then given right back to the company commander, says he did it. Let us say he doesn't do it, then does he get a "no go" and go right on to the next station, no sir, uh, uh, never! Right at that point, he is told "here is the mistake you made, it was on step 2, and you may do this and that and this is where it is at, touch that lever and so on, got it, right, good. Go back to the end of the line. Next." When he comes back up, he starts all over again, no coaching, no help, as if he was never there before, "and what we are requiring you to do here is put a .50 cal machine gun into operation, set head space and timing, are there any questions?" "No, Sergeant." "Good." If he does it perfectly, he still has got a "no go" and that tells the company commander that when we tested him he was not able to do that thing, but before he leaves that station, we are assured that he can do that by himself, with no coaching and with no help, and if he doesn't do it again, you go through the procedure with him again and back to the end of the line with him again, right up until midnight if it is necessary, but it never is. So, that when he is finished that TGST, or whatever kind of testing goes on, whether it is done by the NCO by himself with one of his soldiers, at whatever level it takes place, there is no final failure. Never do we allow a soldier to walk away from there saying, "You failed it now, go back and practice some more until you get it right". The only way he walks away from there is saying, "I couldn't do it when I got here, but now I can do it".

Two statements taken from the unit's training management handbook (page 4) show that the same concept, as discussed above, is intended for incorporation into all training situations as well. These are:

No soldier should be released from training without conclusive proof of learning or specific follow-up measures prescribed on the spot (learning center, recheck tomorrow, etc.).

and

Every learning session must include a critique and the critique must be instructive (do not allow a soldier to leave a critique understanding only that he did something wrong, he must know how to do it right).

Thus it is directed that evaluation be a part of every training activity.

In addition to the positive training value of "no fail" testing, LTC Covington points out the attendant savings in administrative follow-up time. He illustrates this point by describing the "alternate" way to doing things.

> What usually happens is a guy walks up and he takes the test. Right? We say fine, thank you very much. We grade the test. Gee, Jones doesn't know how to do these six things. Back down to the company commander. You better get Jones bucked up. He gets Jones bucked up. What happens is he takes another test to see if he really did get bucked up.
>
> All that process has been gone through because instead of making the test a training vehicle in which a guy walks away and we already know that Jones knows how to do that, we've used up five times as much time to get to exactly the same point we could have gotten to right there on the spot. So think of the time, in that kind of a notion alone, that it saves in training.

The basic internal evaluation program followed by the battalion is outlined in the unit's handbook. On page 5 of Tab B (reproduced in the Appendix to this report), the S-3 is directed to "conduct periodic battalion level diagnostic testing as follows:

a. TGST - [Tank Gunnery Skills Test] - Quarterly and as directed by the commander.

b. SQT - [Skill Qualifications Test] - Annually when not otherwise required.

c. NBC Teams - [Nuclear, Biological, Chemical] - Quarterly.

d. Special Testing of scouts, radar, AVLB, Redeye and mortars as directed."

The S-3 is also directed to conduct weekly training inspections of each company.

Now the discussion which follows tells something about how this testing program was run and how it was intended to augment training.

> We use . . . [testing] within the context of what will provide us with the best training. We run, for example, a tank gunnery skills test for all the tankers, and that includes, by the way, anybody holding MOS's not on a tank, of which there is a fairly substantial number . . . .

What I do when I want to have something like that is I say I want to have one once a quarter. Okay? Now, when in the quarter? That depends entirely on what the company commanders are doing, what they told the S-3 what they want to do, that is the job of the S-3 to get together with the company commanders and say in this three-month period we want to have a TGST. When should we have it, based on what it is that you guys want to do?

And then, based on the company commander's designating when the best time would be to do it that will facilitate training without creating any kind of a jump where everybody stops because of a TGST, that's when it's scheduled. And then who does all the work to do that? The S-3 does. He sits down and writes out the TGST, and it changes everytime a little bit. Why does it change? Because our priorities ma, changing. We may be saying: Gee, our tank commanders seem to be having trouble with so and so, let's include that in the TGST this time and take a look at it. Or, I want to emphasize such and such: Let's put that into the TGST and take a look at it.

So he writes the whole thing up. He organizes the entire thing. His NCO's run the whole thing--they do get help from the companies because there are not enough NCO's here; . . . then he provides all the equipment for it, outside of the tanks. Companies will provide some of the tanks that will be there at a certain time. He hands it out to them, a month in advance, so that they know what's going to be on it.

Now, he doesn't give them--we have a written test every time, too, which is something we do just because we get some interesting insights and . . . the tests are different every single time. But we tell them what the test questions will be about, you know. . . . We're going to ask--the test will concern itself with questions concerning those subjects. The rest of it, the stations on the test, we give them exactly what's going to be required. You're going to go to tank No. 1 and on tank No. 1 you're going to be required to bore sight a tank. And the test is divided into gunners, loaders, drivers and TC's. If the guy is the tank commander he takes all of them. He takes the loader's test, the gunner's test, and driver's test and the TC's test. If he's a gunner, he takes two of them; if he's a driver he takes just his and his loader takes his.

Now, so they have all of that in advance. If they want to, they can conduct their own mini-TGST's as often as they feel like in the course of their own training. And they frequently do when they go out to the field.

The next section reveals how results of performance testing were used within the battalion. This also encompasses an important aspect of training

management not previously discussed, i.e., the process of analyzing feedback to evaluate and reformulate priorities and emphases for training.

> When SQT is given, we take the results on it and it is the S-3's job to analyze the SQT results in detail, by man, by job, by platoon, by MOS, company by section and to gear those results to the first-line NCO, so the first line NCO is responsible for the guy whose test scores are being shown, it's geared to his name, so when we look at those things we immediately look at half a dozen things, one of which is who is the guy responsible for training this guy. . . . All of that is done by the S-3, given to the company so the companies don't have to do the final analysis, it is given to them and that is part of the S-3's job. The same thing is true for the TGST, and the same thing is true for TPT. We don't run TPT's too often, we run one anywhere from two to four times a year, depending basically on how I feel about whether it will be useful to us or not, companies internally run their own TPT's, TGST's and so on, much more frequently and I don't even look at those results, because I know my commanders know how to do the business of training. Because I talk to them about how to do that all of the time, that is for their own consumption. The things we do at battalion level, we provide the final analysis, geared to the things that are vital to training and give it to them. That goes into their training management book for them to use in further prioritizing their training. Has to do with feedback and testing. First of all we go to Baumholder training area two to three times a year. Next year we are going three times. There are many, many things there, that are looked at in terms of evaluation and that is where feedback comes back from. Everything from the most obvious, like tank gunnery, in this we are talking about hits on target against time criteria and so on--extensive records of testing. Right here I can tell you, for example, how every tank . . . [has] done the last six times they fired. Now then, we look at that we delete the guys that are not here anymore, take a look at that in terms of analyzing the potential of each tank and look at the new guys that are in that tank from that aspect. In addition to that, one of the number of things we do, the S-3 keeps a board back there. It's called a Tank Brief Status Chart. That shows all the latest SQT scores for every member of each one of those crews, the status of the tank and problems historically we have with the tank itself, numbers of the crews, last TGST scores, things they were weak on, strong on and a number of other things. . . . So those are the kinds of things we do that provide evaluation and feedback.

In the next excerpt we get a glimpse of LTC Covington's view of external evaluation. He is responding to a question about whether evaluations such as the ARTEP contribute to unit readiness and sustainment.

> Yes, they can be, or they can't be. It all depends on how they are conducted and what their purpose is intended to be and how they are used. For example, we had what I considered to be, although it's

not maybe possible to do it exactly the way we did it year in and year out because of the resource expenditure, but just the ideal ARTEP [which] was geared toward soldier performance, hands-on demonstration of ability to do things. Probably the best ARTEP ever conducted in the history of the United States Army, and that was about a year and a half ago under General Gorman. . . . It was the ideal, but I don't think we can do it in the Army at large either. We have to do something like that, but not quite as good as that.

But, here's my point: At the end of that ARTEP what happened? Did you get a big list of deficiencies and so on saying you better rush out and correct all of these things, and so on and so forth? No. Was there some list of these guys did fantastic and these guys did poorly and so on and so forth? No. There was a consultation between the commanding general and the battalion commander and all that was said was this: Look, here is a lot of data which we have provided based on this ARTEP. It is for your use and your benefit. We know that you are working on making our units better and better all the time and keeping them that way. There may be some information in here which will assist you in being able to do that, so use it as you see fit, and here are some things that might be useful that other people have done that are techniques that are proven to be successful, and that's it.

Now, when you get an ARTEP like that, you gear yourself to constant sustained readiness and you go into an ARTEP and say fine, it's another training exercise from which we will get some value that will be useful to us as we continue to do the Army's business. But you don't say to yourself: Drop everything. There's an ARTEP coming up. We've got to look fantastic, whatever it takes--repaint the tanks, do this, do that. And what happens every time you drop everything? You drop sustainment training.

And as a last point, there is a less obvious form of evaluation that is used by the battalion commander, and to others responsible for managing training, on almost a daily basis. He talks to people and asks them questions about what they are doing, how they are getting along, problems they're having, and so on. Here he makes an interesting point about the utility of this technique.

There are ways to ask questions and ways not to ask questions, and how not to ask a question is, if anything, more important than how to ask one. What I'm talking about here is this: You walk up to a guy, a tank commander, in the United States Army, and say, "What condition is your tank in?" or words to that effect. Well, the answer that you're going to get is, "My tank is in great shape, Sir. We're ready to go." And then you say , "How about your crew, what kind of crew you got?" "I got the greatest crew in the world, Sir. We're going to outshoot everybody in the world, Sir." And I ask you, now that you've asked those two questions and gotten those two answers, what do you know?

What do you even know about whether that NCO knows anything, let alone the answer to the type of question you've asked? But. What we do of course is--once you get those two responses you say that's great and walk off. Unless we're thinking about that and unless we say to ourselves, hey, I haven't learned a damned thing--then we're liable to do that by mistake. So what you have to do is say, that's not the way you ask a question. That's not the way you respond to a question.

The way you ask a question of a non-commissioned officer leader . . . is: "tell me specifically what the condition of that tank is in terms of exactly what items of BII you do not have on board in serviceable condition now and what the status of getting them is. How many rounds have been fired down that gun tube? How long do you estimate it will be before you have to replace your sprockets and track pads? What is the history of this vehicle in terms of the maintenance difficulties we have had with it over the past six months?"

Now, when you get the answers to those questions, you're getting specific answers to specific questions that tell you all kinds of things, only one of which is what the condition of the tank is. It also tells you a good deal about the quality of thought that that guy has put into the business of maintaining his vehicle, how much he cares about it, and what he knows about it. It tells you a lot about him.

Maintenance

Maintenance and maintenance training have been briefly touched upon at several points. Although the subject of maintenance was not discussed in great detail during the interviews, some of the philosophies and practices that are a part of this important area of operations were addressed. In looking at these we begin with a pronouncement about the state of maintenance in the battalion and very direct statements about the real significance of maintenance.

As a matter of fact, this is the best maintained tank battalion in Europe. I'll guarantee that. But the main reason that is--the reason that it is is not because we've got some super-duper deluxe maintenance program. The reason it is, is because we look at maintenance as being something, and we try to teach our soldiers and talk to our people about maintenance in a way that makes sense. You know, starting off with why do we even bother maintaining the vehicles. Now, nine times out of ten we get a whole raft of reasons that they're not maintained: your OR rate drops down, this, that and the other--that's

not the reason. The OR rate is nothing but a reflection of what kinds of problems we've got. We are not maintaining to support the OR rate; we are maintaining in order to see to it that we can successfully accomplish our mission in battle, and clearly, any private can understand that. If his tank is not fully operational and if he doesn't know what makes it fully operational and pay attention to those things, then he may die in war because of that. That's why we maintain the OR. That's why we take care of the equipment. That's what the level of importance is.

All too often I've found that everything else that may be said to a private or an NCO or anything else about the things we do, it never gets around to the real reason why we want to do them which makes plenty of sense to everybody. It makes a lot of sense to all the privates. We're talking about their lives. . . . And those other things don't make any sense. And the reason they don't make any sense is because it's superficial, because that is not the real reason to begin with.

In fact the last paragraph could apply as well to everything that is done in the battalion.

We turn next to the unit's published statements outlining the desired approach to maintenance which are contained in the training management handbook (pp 2-3). These fairly specifically establish what is expected of particular supervisors.

1. Our whole attitude toward maintenance must be reoriented. Maintenance includes care, cleaning, and training on the entire spectrum of equipment assigned to the battalion. The narrow focus usually adopted by Army units which views maintenance as long periods of time when hundreds of soldiers crawl around their tanks must go. It wastes time, discourages soldiers and usually does not get the job done. In this area the following principles apply:

a. When crews are performing maintenance, NCO's are expected to instruct and insure that soldiers are learning something about their vehicles and equipment, (how they run, preventive maintenance indicators, purpose for making checks, etc.). If a soldier works all day on his vehicle without really knowing what he is doing and why he is doing it an NCO has failed.

b. If the crew has done everything necessary during a maintenance period don't waste their time--immediately turn to Soldier's Manual training, maintenance of other equipment, and occasionally giving them time off for exceptional performance.

c. Vehicle commanders are expected to know from memory the exact status of their vehicle to include past problems, current - 10 and 2404 entries, by item, tool shortages and projected problems (track wear, gun tube wear, next Q service, etc.).

d. Motor stables when well thought out and carefully executed can be valuable; when not planned and conducted precisely, they are worthless. Units choosing to use motor stables will insure that they are periodic not daily, short and intensive not long and dull, oriented on specific not general objectives and accomplished perfectly not marginally.

e. Company level officers are expected to know how to conduct FSC inspections on their vehicles and do so monthly.

And finally the following extract provides at least a view of the sort of regimen that was followed with respect to maintenance.

When they schedule Q services, they go through the S-3 too, to make sure that it's not bouncing against something else. There's always a place to have them; it's only choosing the right place so that it moves with the continuum of business instead of against it. Those Q services for quality control are observed and are assisted by the battalion. Every other one is company; every other one the battalion does themselves. The battalion maintenance does it. But the point is the quality of the Q services, not the fact that they exist. Although, in some places the fact that they exist would be phenomenal because there are some places where they really don't even hold Q services, but not too many of them. Every now and then you'll even find that's not happening. But it's the quality of it. It takes no more time; it may take less time. And yet, every time we pull a Q on a tank, and we have five packs out on the ground every day of the year that we're in Europe, that pack does come out. Every time. Whether it needs it or not, so to speak. It comes out automatically. The hull is completely cleaned out. All the connections in the hull of the tank are checked out. The electrical system is checked out. The oil is drained and the oil filters and the fuel filters are all replaced. They don't cost that much. They don't cost half as much as it costs, if you blow a pack, because you didn't take care of it.

The whole thing is steamed cleaned off and so on. Then we do a number of other things. The pack goes back in the tank after being ground pumped; the tank goes for a short ride, and we check it out. Then you've got a tank that's been well taken care of in terms of Q services. So that is a programmed thing.

At the company level it's up to the company commander. When is he going to pull the maintenance? What kind of maintenance? I don't care whether the guy wants to run motor stables or not run motor stables. I don't think that there's anything magic about motor stables, for example.

> Are motor stables good? What I tell my guys is if they're conducted well, they're good. If they're not conducted well, they're lousy. There are lots of ways to take good care of our tanks and all the rest of our equipment; if that's the one you want to use, go ahead. But you're under no constraints to do so. What you're under constraint to do is to meet our standards of quality care of our soldiers and of our equipment.

Professional Development

Professional development in the context of training management refers to those efforts which are directed at improving upon the technical knowledge or organizational, leadership or training skills of NCO's and junior officers. This would include as well opportunities and inducements for self-improvement. Although professional development was not a specific topic of inquiry during the interviews, some of LTC Covington's responses touched on this area at several points. Therefore, this cannot be construed to represent an overview of professional development activities within the battalion--only several allusions to such activities which were felt to warrant inclusion. The first extract below is taken to express his outlook on the subject in general. Thereafter, other references will be cited which indicate some ways that professional development is encouraged and achieved. These references identify some expectations for officers and NCO's and some specific activities aimed at professional development.

> For example, a subject that has a high-visibility concept in the Army for the last four or five years, and deservedly so, is non-commissioned officer professionalism. Nine times out of ten I will guarantee you that you will walk into a unit and you will find a program, that is, the non-commissioned officer professionalism program. Non-commissioned officer professionalism is not a program. It's a way of life. It has to be a way of life. How do you make it a way of life and sustain it as a way of life? You create the atmosphere in which non-commissioned officers can be professionals. And that takes 20 times the thought that creating a program which can be put up on some chart showing that every three weeks every guy was briefed on the duties of an NCO and all this sort of stuff will ever do.

The following extract from the training management handbook outlines general performance expectations for senior NCO's as well as inducements for meeting these expectations. Also, on page 6 of the same document it is directed that one hour per week will be allotted to NCO professionalism classes given by the first sergeant and that there will be at least one officer professionalism class per month, given by the company commander.

> 2. Technical competence on the part of our most crucial NCO leader/ trainers (E6 and E7) is essential. General knowledge is not satisfactory.
>
> a. Any NCO in these grades who fails to do extremely well on internal diagnostic tests, TGST, SQT and the like will be counselled and immediately required to pursue a program to upgrade his proficiency. Continued failure to improve significantly is sufficient grounds to recommend against promotion. In this area, the proof is in the pudding not the recipe.
>
> b. This battalion has the resources (training aids, learning center and equipment) to allow every NCO to upgrade his technical competence. Tank Companies will take advantage of their Master Gunners to assist in this area.
>
> 3. Technical competence alone will not guarantee properly trained soldiers; it must be paralleled by the ability to train well. Identifying outstanding trainers is simple - their soldiers know how to do what they are supposed to know how to do. The converse is equally true. The answer to improvement is in training the trainer (A senior NCO, officer assisted job) incorporating the following principles:
>
> a. The First Sergeant of every company will consider himself to be the training NCO and primary trainer of trainers.

The next excerpt from the first interview talks about one type of NCO course that has been conducted in the battalion, and includes some of the rationale behind the particular course.

> We also run special NCO classes, we have done this twice, we are getting ready to do it again and its been a huge success and the praise of the NCO's. We are getting ready to run one now. [It's] going to be taught in the evenings and on Saturday mornings, for about 25 non-commissioned officers. Most of them are volunteers; the ones that aren't I selected. The whole thing is oriented on effective speaking and effective writing and the entire class of 40 hours is based solely on using the medium of things like EER's, writing up awards, writing up training schedules, and the sorts of things that we do write and do

need to be good at. Now this kind of a class reaches much further than NCO development in the most superficial sense of the word. Fifty percent of the reason we have these classes is not for the NCO's to begin with, it's for the soldiers, because the non-commissioned officer who is sweating bullets when it's time to recognize one of his soldiers and can't put pen to paper and doesn't, is not recognizing his soldier. The non-commissioned officer who wants to say the right thing about a guy he thinks a lot of who he would see to be a sergeant major one day, 15 or 20 years from now, but can't do it, is going to see to it that that guy doesn't become a command sergeant major one of these days. Fifty percent of the reason for that course is for the sake of the soldiers in the battalion and the other 50% for the NCO's. Because if the guy doesn't want to go there for himself I have a good reason for him to be going anyhow. It doesn't have anything to do with him directly, it has a whole lot to do with his ability as a leader and his ability to do the kinds of things he should be able to do on behalf of his soldiers, which in the larger sense plays a very large role in the way we do the whole business of all of these administrative things that we can gear to what it is we are trying to accomplish.

Along the same line, the previously described training management seminars, while serving a specific training management function, also seemed to contain aspects which were geared toward professional development. In addition LTC Covington frequently mentioned talking to soldiers and NCO's about professionalism and leadership. This is no doubt another way he went about establishing the sort of atmosphere, which he mentioned earlier, that encourages professional development.

Preparation for Command

The discussion with LTC Covington regarding his own preparation for command was rather brief and a portion of it was lost in the recording process. The portion that was obtained is presented below in a question and answer format with only minor editing from the original transcript.

Q. How were you taught to be a battalion commander?

A. I wasn't taught to be a battalion commander. Well, maybe I shouldn't say that. To some extent, the same way that I'm trying to teach my company commanders to be battalion commanders. Through things that people that I have worked for have done specifically

designed to see to it that I understood certain things about what a battalion was all about. Things that I didn't really have to know to do the job I was doing, but that were very useful to me. And the second, by example. Third, and most important, the most critical, bigger than all the rest put together, by thinking about it.

Q. Did you think a lot before you took on your job?

A. Oh, yeah. I'd been thinking about it ever since I was a company commander, in general terms. Six months before I assumed command I dedicated a whole lot of special thought to it. A lot.

Q. What were you doing at that time?

A. I was at MILPERCEN, Europe. In Europe. In Heidelberg.

Q. When did you think about it? At night?

A. All the time, any time I had spare time; all the time.

Q. Did you do any studying, special preparation?

A. Oh yes. I read about 17 volumes of information. . . . that I gathered together. Well, for example, none of this is hard to do. Not hard to do. If you care. I wrote to General Gorman in TRADOC and said I'm not sure that I know what all the related things are that are out on the business of training from TRADOC, but I'd very much appreciate it if I could get a copy of all of them. And he gave it to somebody and they sent me a couple of boxes of the latest materials on the business of SQT and so on and so forth. So, there was that.

Q. Did you study all that?

A. Oh, yeah. Sure I did. I went to USAREUR and got a copy of the MTOE, sat down with the MTOE, analyzed it in detail, you know, how many E8's, where are the shortfalls, where do we have tankers that are not really on a tank and what is that going to mean in terms of seeing what we might be able to do with them.

Q. Did you do this alone or did you work with anybody.

A. I did it alone. No.

Q. You didn't have anybody you worked with on it or talked about?

A. No. But I didn't need to. But that's the whole point actually. We've got the greatest resource we're ever going to have to teach us about things, that's standing just above our neck, and all we have to do is use it. We don't need a group, which is not to say you don't learn things from people; you do, of course. But, I think the thing that perhaps we tend to recognize the least is we can learn from ourselves, if we will take the time.

COMMENTS ON TRAINING MANAGEMENT LITERATURE

As noted previously, each of the four participating battalion commanders had been asked to review the ARI/USAREUR Training Management Guide prior to interviews and discussions with the research team. Because a principal research objective was concerned with evaluation of training management guidance, the commanders' comments about the ARI/USAREUR guidebook and other training management literature were singled out for separate consideration. Some of the commentary is directed at TRADOC's Training Circular 21-5-7, "Training Management in Battalions" and still other comments reflect on commanders' general disposition toward the use of training management guidance. This latter factor may be as significant as any other to the projected effectiveness of a guidebook approach to facilitating training management. Perspectives of the battalion commanders are presented in the same sequence as before.

LTC Jim Madden

In reviewing comments and references to the Training Management Guide (henceforth the guidebook), it is both interesting and important to recall that the conceptual development and background work for the guidebook was done in LTC Madden's battalion under his sponsorship. A number of his comments are quite critical. The first comment, an indirect appraisal, refers to the research team that authored the guidebook.

> I'd sit there like I'm sitting with you, you know while I was trying to run a battalion explaining all this to these guys. Then they'd go back and write it up and send it to me and I'd say, "No, that's not it." And then they wrote it up and that was the handbook. I just spent the whole year explaining to them what I was doing and they never quite got it right.

And yet it would appear from descriptions of management in his battalion that LTC Madden agreed in concept, and in practice, with the most basic tenets of

the guidebook, namely: Analysis of mission to establish goals, priorities and sustainment frequencies; detailed specification of goals and standards; and scheduling evaluation events by battalion to determine if goals and standards are met (accountability). Thus, an apparent paradox is raised which can only be noted, not explained.

The next excerpt gives some background on his perception of how and why the guidebook took the form that it did. (For reference, the framework of the guidebook is represented in Figure 1.)

> Now what this was designed to do was one simple thing. Have you ever heard of mandatory training? Have you ever heard of on-the-job training? Have you ever heard of the requirement to send guys off to school? Have you every heard of in-processing training? I've got to do that in a battalion. What is my source for explaining how to do that? What is the bible for everybody in the Army on how to manage their training? Well, it's right there [TC 21-5-7]. Okay, now turn to me in that book and show me where it explains how to manage OJT training, in-processing training, school allocations. [TC 21-5-7 doesn't specifically]. What I was pointing out to those guys was because of the environment in which it was written, it does a wonderful job of explaining what is 90 percent of the job of the S-3, which is what I call somewhere in between what I call major events, the major tactical things, SQT, so on and so forth. But there is more to training management than that. That S-3 needs a little guidance on how to handle mandatory training; on-the-job training; maintenance, which is a kind of training; school allocations; and in-processing, particularly in Europe. To get through in-process it takes you two or three weeks. He's going to have a little model to handle all that. I disregard it because, quite frankly, we don't have a model for handling school allocations. All that hubbub you read in our report [the research report documenting development of the guidebook] and the introduction about this is what I was saying you need, the system you use for maintenance or for schools is not exactly the same system I got up here. So each one of them has it's own little sub-model. This sub-model here handles, for the most part, your collective and individual sustainment but there will be another model for on-the-job training, we handle that a little bit different. I'm just trying to show that when you get all done, and we were very ambitious when we started that study, that we would be able to write models for all these sub-systems and then your overall system would be a cover. Well, I never discussed OJT and school, so what they did was they went down to my S-3 and got a lot of stuff and they made up their own decisions on what to do, some good and some bad. I wouldn't suggest that you go out to units and do this. Yeah, it's fine and it's going to give you the big picture, but schools and all that is a different kettle of fish and a different order of magnitude.

To illustrate what is meant by school, etc., representing a different order of magnitude, an earlier statement is included.

> You can't worry about schools. It's below your attention level. It's a non-problem. There are very few schools, there are very few allocations . . . so you could have in effect a scale that's something like this, for instance, trouble shoot the schools, you could weight it 10 percent, whereas unit sustainment you might weight 80 percent. Schools business . . . it's an administrative function.

The following statements refer directly to Figure 1, and specifically the components of training management listed in the left hand column. Where he says "below" he is referring to the center horizontal line on the matrix, which seperates Mandatory Training and On-the-Job Training, and he is making this distinction to differentiate the relative importance to management of the types of training listed.

> Yes, you can break it down [like this] but what you have got as your first [sub-model] major events is a misnomer, that's a sub-set of unit sustainment. And unit sustainment is a misnomer. Unit sustainment isn't sending guys off to school, sustaining the unit. Yes, it's part of the overall sustainment process. Cross out unit and put in collective. That's the training of your platoons and of your squads and so on. Yes, does he have goals for collective training and individual training, that's fine,--and for mandatory training. But now when you crossed through mandatory training and go below [the line]--everything you've got below is 10 percent of the problem, the time and the effort, and everything you've got above is 90 percent of the time and management process involved to make it work. So, that's all I was saying.

And finally, comments that are tangentially related to the guidebook, the sustainment model of training management which it embodies, are LTC Madden's opinions about the general acceptance and utility of guidebooks and models in the field. In three different places he states these similar sentiments.

> Nobody wants a new management model.

> . . . but to write another management model and ship it out to the field--nobody is going to read it. Nobody is going to check and see if anybody reads it.

And the last statement identifies his reasoning behind this opinion.

> But if you can come up with the greatest model in the world, you won't be able to sell it and nobody will read it because their perception is that they're all experts and that they're all doing pretty damn good.

LTC Frank D. Miller, Jr.

Not all of LTC Miller's comments about the guidebook were captured on tape, but his summary comments, presented here, are quite favorable.

> Again, what I like about this document is that it is in fact another attempt at unifying the training management field and it addresses all aspects of training and we are coming more and more to the columns approach to doing business, which is everything in training. We are applying the same systems approach to each phase of the training, from the scheduling of training to the actual performance, whether it is a field exercise or individual training in preparation for SQT or OJT of a young man that doesn't have a skill yet; the formal schooling system to managing our maintenance programs to inventorying tools, and dealing with property, the whole works is in here. It's the same systems approach. You decide what your objectives are, you program those objectives in blocks, you plot the time to make them happen, then you force it to happen. Then you have some sort of inspection or check procedure to give you feedback on how successful you were and then you plan the next iteration. And if you can get that all together now, if you have all these separate building blocks, and now if you can lay out an annual training plan and integrate those separate building blocks into a unified whole, then I think that it would be a marvelous exercise.

Elsewhere, when discussing his evaluation techniques and again when talking about his synthesis in training management concepts and practices, he had stated that, in his battalion, he did pretty much those things outlined in the guidebook. And in reviewing other excerpts cited earlier which concerned evaluation and overall training management, LTC Miller did appear to adhere to at least three major practices prescribed in the guidebook, namely, (1) analysis to prioritize skills, at least by global category, (2) quarterly repetition of skills/tasks considered most critical, and (3) holding quarterly inspection/evaluation events to measure unit status.

And finally, LTC Miller offered his views on the possibility of unit sustainment when discussing the problems of personnel turbulence and comparing the U.S. and German systems:

> The idea of getting to a sustaining level as opposed to a repetitive basic training level appeals to me very much. But I don't think we are going to lick the problem of not enough time to do everything and do it well until we go to some sort of sustained assignment program.

LTC Jack T. Garven, Jr.

Because the evaluation of the battalion training management model (ARI/USAREUR guidebook) was ongoing in LTC Garven's battalion, the precepts had been previously discussed with LTC Garven at length. Therefore, this was not a topic of discussion during the presented interviews. (The results of the evaluation are reported in Hill and Sticht, 1980.) LTC Garven is in basic agreement with the concepts embodied in the model: (1) identification of goals, priorities and performance standards at battalion level; (2) dissemination of these as requirements at battery (company) level; (3) selective and recurrent testing to determine if progress toward goals and standards is being made; (4) revision of goals and priorities based on results of testing. Of the guidebook itself, he has said (in written comments), "For an S-3 with no plan or experience, this guide would provide a good start for a centralized battalion training program." However, he has gone on to say that he can't imagine that a major would come to the position of S-3 without sufficient unit experience to have an approach to training management already formulated. He has also suggested that the administrative overhead at battalion level to carryout the guidance as prescribed might be too great relative to projected benefit.

The following comments make specific reference to the guidebook procedures outlining mission/task analysis to identify goals and standards.

> But, you know, it's all there [already]. I don't think we have to give them any new check lists. Section competition, if we continue to go by the annex, is spelled out for us. We don't have to figure what we want to do--it's right there. You gotta do this. The battery ARTEP--a published document. You have to achieve goals in this area, you have to perform these tasks in these times, these results. That's prescriptive. And the battalion ARTEP's the same way. So we've got check lists already to tell us what we have to do, you know, and what standards we have to achieve. We don't have to make anything up. And I don't think it's unreasonable to say to a battery commander, okay, now, you take your ARTEP. We're going to be evaluating you up against [ARTEP] 6-165. Now you've got three weeks before you ever go to the MTA, you've got the results of your last ARTEP plus the results of your last battalion ARTEP which you were a part of, . . . and you have a 6-165, go crazy.

The following comments, excerpted from the present interviews, reflect LTC Garven's views of available training management literature at a more general level.

> I haven't read anything that's made me feel any better about doing training management things better. Actual experience to witness something taking place and to learn from the three dimensional experience the thing going on has been more meaningful to me than any printed word that I've picked up.

* * * * *

> You know, . . . if you don't have any concept of training, training management, . . . I can't imagine any piece of literature starting you off there and if you do have some concept, your biases are probably going to be such, as mine probably are, that you're going to disregard information that might appear to others in that particular section or that particular area as being helpful. The Ace Collins book [Common Sense Training], when I first started reading it, I was very excited. But the more I got to read it, the more I realized that he was preaching to the choir. And everything that he said was, yes, very common sense.

LTC Benjamin Covington

LTC Covington discussed the guidebook in general terms during both interviews and also submitted written comments from his review of the document. We begin with the written commentary.

The primary thrust of this document is what to do rather than how to do it. The writer does not seem to really understand sustainment training except in the most academic sense. I see nothing in here on where to find time, the psychology of making all time training time, how to organize guard and details, supervisors' booklets and their use, learning center, the role of the 3 and staff, etc., the nature and purpose of training guidance--how to do it; how not to do it!

The document is not of any significance because it does not address the real gut business of techniques for making it happen.

The following commentary on the guidebook is excerpted from the taped interviews. In this excerpt LTC Covington reflects on both the ARI/USAREUR guidebook and on TRADOC's TC 21-5-7 and expresses his view that books like these only scratch the surface of what it takes to train units in the Army.

What you're going to find out as you go around to different units is your going to find three different kinds of things. You are going to find a lot of people that know a sufficient number of buzz words and terms and are doing the same thing that we have been doing for the last twenty or thirty years but they are just using a lot of new words and terminology to cover the same stuff. You're going to find some units that have given it [how to achieve combat readiness] a lot of thought but, in fact, do not understand the real essence, the heart of the business and because they don't, they have turned unconsciously to a "systems" approach. This document [ARI/USAREUR guidebook] is a good example of that. An attempt to document, segment, to compartmentalize, so that you have what appears to be a system that will work. But a large part of the business of successfully training a unit in the Army is not systematizable in this sense. It is systematizable but not in the systems sense of compartmenting things and testing and retesting and double testing and so on. As a result, this sort of thing, if you look at it closely, if you get down into the guts of it and find out whether it is being done this way or not, you will discover everytime, I guarantee, that it is not being done like that, because it cannot be. But on the surface you will find lots of charts, graphs, bargraphs and so on and so forth that tend to suggest that it is. What you have to find out is what the soldiers really know and what they don't. Then you will find a few [units], I'm afraid far too few, where a whole lot of thought along with a real understanding of what the business is all about, has produced the kind of thing we really want to see on a daily basis in units in the U.S. Army.

The fundamentals are laid out and there are a number of TRADOC documents such as this one [TC 21-5-7] and if you read that with your mind open and thinking, then it's possible to understand very clearly what those concepts are. And there's where the possibility [is] for the first

critical mistake to be made. And that is to assume that once you have read that with an open mind and a open heart and do have a real feeling for what it's all about that you've done all of it. What I was saying basically is this: Once you have digested with a positive attitude and an open mind 21-5-7, the big mistake you can make is to assume that you've got it--you don't have it at all, not yet. Because 21-5-7 only serves the purpose of explaining in a very straightforward and understandable way what the fundamental notions involved in this business are. But there's a whole other book beneath that one that hasn't been written and that is, what are all of the little things, what are all the small things you do to make it a reality.

In this next segment the interviewer is asking LTC Covington to consider the matrix, which is depicted in Figure 1, that represents the general framework of the ARI/USAREUR training management model.

Question: Speaking of organization, here is a matrix. I would like you to comment on it. . . . Is this matrix meaningful to you?

LTC Covington: No.

Question: Is it meaningful in terms of what you do? Are these processes that you think about while you manage your unit?

LTC Covington: Yeah, I think about it, but to say that is not saying very much you see. If you say do you think about mandatory training, of course, I think about mandatory training, but the point is, how do you think about mandatory training, how do you execute it, how do you see to it that it doesn't become paramount and exclude other things and how do you integrate it into the business of training and, therefore, the question of whether I think about it or not, the answer is yes, and now that you know that, you don't know a . . . thing about my answer.

Question: Okay. Major events and then you have processes to perform for each of these components in this matrix, they are as stated here, accountability analysis, mission task analysis, scheduling, performance evaluation and monitoring, etc., for each one of these components of the USAREUR battalion training managment model. Are the components correct in your way of thinking?

LTC Covington: No.

Question: Should there be more or less?

LTC Covington: They should be different. That's the point. What I have been saying to you here you won't find in a way you can slap something that you call accountability analysis. What the hell does that mean? That's a term that would have to have some big, long description to begin with because on the surface of it, I don't have the foggiest notion of what it means. Now I have read dictum that says accountability analysis,

that goes all nice, neat and orderly, and so on. It is nice, neat and orderly, but it is meaningless in my opinion, because it doesn't get down to the guts of the business of effective sustainment training, how you really do it, what you have to really think about, how serious you have to be about it and how rational and common sense you have to be about it, how you have got to be willing to discard, junk and get on with the things that are important. You can't do that on a piece of paper like this. It can be written, everything that I have said can be written in a form that makes sense to everybody--and it's worthwhile. It can be written, but this is not the format that anybody is going to read with any enthusiasm and, frankly, if I had one of these things, after looking at it I would pitch it in the garbage can, because it is not of any use to me. I don't think it would be any actual honest-to-goodness rational utilitarian value to anybody.

LTC Covington spoke, during this and a subsequent interview, about the way that training management guidance could be presented in order to be of value, and how, in the final analysis, it must be individualized for each battalion. (The following statements are combined from the two interviews.)

When you want to get it across in this business, when you want to really talk about it, saving breath is exactly what is not important. What is important is elaborating and expounding on just exactly what it is that "that" means and how we want to accomplish it, and how you get around to actually doing it. . . . That's the book that has to be written by battalion commanders. . . . There has to be one written for each separate battalion individually, and there has to be one--there could be one written probably, for all of us. But then, each battalion commander, even after that one has been written, has got to write the addendums to that book for his battalion.

* * * * *

Now we are talking about writing a book that is somewhat in style to a novel as opposed to a research paper when we are talking about these things and would be infinitely more readable I might add. But that book, that I was talking about before, that other volume, that is not there, is the volume that has to be written by the battalion commander, it has to be written by understanding fundamental concepts and then using good common sense, a dash of imagination and a lot of hard mental work to see to it that it comes to reality and for what. That's the ticket and that's what a lot of people don't understand, unfortunately. They think that once they have the superficial aspect of it, they have a grip on things and it is no longer necessary to keep your brain in gear. They think everything is copacetic.

* * * * *

The kind of products that I find to be not useful and extremely boring are long categories which put everything into little blocks. Such a document is exactly the kind of thing that turns me off.

COMPARISONS AMONG PERSPECTIVES

The comparison and contrast among stated approaches and perspectives of the four battalion commanders will follow the same general topic sequence around which individual profiles were structured, namely: philosophies; training management approaches; preparation for command; and finally, comparison of the views taken with respect to guidance in the ARI/USAREUR training management guidebook. No attempt is made to evaluate the relative merit of any of the stances taken. Similarly, it is not possible to make inferences about practices in any unit which were not specifically explicated in the interviews. However, it is acknowledged that comparisons drawn are interpretive in nature.

Philosophies

The principal comparisons that can be drawn within this topic are with respect to priorities and goals. All of the commanders stated, in various terms, a goal of combat readiness for their unit, of being prepared to perform their missions in combat. Therefore, unit sustainment, in terms of individual and collective skill sustainment and operational readiness of equipment, can be said to be a common goal for the four battalion commanders. However, there were differences in priorities and emphases cited during the interviews.

LTC Madden placed a great deal of emphasis on weapons proficiency within his unit, and personal emphasis on managing training, managing time and resources, and on evaluating and tracking the performance capabilities of sub-units. He pursued the specification of performance goals and performance standards for his units in great detail, and developed an intricate system for scheduling and tracking statuses.

LTC Miller expressed as his highest priority NCO and officer professional development. To this end he supported a number of training programs within

the battalion and even enlisted outside assistance (Central Texas College) to bolster this area of training. Next in priorities he emphasized life-sustaining capabilities: physical fitness and tactical competence on the part of troops; systematic maintenance for equipment. And his third emphasis is on engineer particular skills and operational capabilities.

LTC Garven and LTC Covington both take the stated approach that everything is important and should receive equal emphasis. LTC Garven said that training, maintenance and troop welfare are inseparable. LTC Covington stated that every area was treated and analyzed to the same level of detail. This is not to say that within areas to be managed there were not priorities. The training management handbook developed by LTC Covington and his staff was designed to assist the company commanders in "continually evaluating, re-evaluating, prioritizing and re-prioritizing his responsibility to see to it that the company is well trained." He also said in effect that it's not possible to do everything and when they decide to do "X" they delete "Y" from their program or schedule. "There is no such thing as building up. . . . If there is something better to be done, then we want to substitute [for] something that is less effective and do that instead." Here a direct contrast can be drawn to LTC Garven who has said, "I don't believe that there are just so many things that we can do. . . . I'm offered that by commanders and staff and yet I submit there are an infinite number of things that we can do and we probably don't know what we can do ourselves."

LTC Madden and LTC Miller didn't talk very much about leadership, except the latter did stress the importance of developing leadership capabilities in his small unit leaders. Both LTC Garven and LTC Covington seemed to emphasize their own leadership roles--in addressing the battalion, handing out awards,

talking to troops individually, personally following up on directives as necessary and observing and evaluating unit performance. LTCs Miller, Garven and Covington all stress the importance of the NCO role in training and in motivating soldiers to learn. LTC Garven particularly indicated reliance on a strong CSM to guide the NCO ranks.

Another area of comparison is possible in the way that the battalion commanders talk about soldiers and about relating to them. Little insight can be gleamed with respect to LTC Madden's approach to his soldiers because he did not discuss this aspect of command. It should be noted that he had been invited to ARI specifically to talk about his training management program. In the only reference to individual troops, he did say that his approach to bringing new soldiers up to speed was to toss them in with everyone else and that they would be assimilated into the unit through a process of personally experiencing the requirements and through some peer instruction and squad leader coaching as needed.

LTC Miller talked about the importance of treating each soldier as a person, getting to know them and something about them. He saw this as an important aspect of troop welfare and as contributing to unit cohesion as well. LTC Garven has said that troops need to be mentally and physically challenged and kept busy--that they'll work hard if you give them something meaningful to do. Like LTC Covington, he enjoys recognizing the achievers and relishes the ceremony of presenting awards. LTC Covington regards his troops as outstanding "because that's the way we think about our soldiers. We choose to believe that our soldiers are damn good from the day they walk in. To the extent that they are not, that's our responsibility. We have the capability and space to see to it that they are helped." LTC Covington

also talks about the importance of interacting frequently and informally with the soldiers, chatting about what they are doing, asking questions, and emphasizing the importance of what they are doing. He makes the further point of assigning each soldier responsibility for thinking about better ways to accomplish the work of the unit.

Training Management Approaches

Some of the most direct comparisons available under this heading are with respect to the amount of structure imposed on training, the degree of centralization of program responsibility, and the basic unit of time around which training is cycled. Naturally these are not unrelated parameters. Both LTC Madden and LTC Miller used the calendar quarter as the basic unit for their training cycles, programing the repetition of most important skills at least every three months. Judging from his training management handbook, LTC Covington's program incorporated cycles of various intervals ranging from three months to a year. LTC Garven plans training on the basis of an annual cycle except for mandatory requirements that occur more frequently.

LTC Madden said of himself, "I like structure," and indeed his training program is seen as the most formalized and systematized, at least on paper. While LTC Miller likes the "columns approach," and used matrices and lists for projecting training requirements, he is seen as occupying a more moderate position on the "structuring" continuum. He has developed a regularized, well defined cycle and framework for training, as outlined earlier, but also identifies the options and latitude available to company commanders within that framework, and pretty much lets them determine how they are going to accomplish their training.

While LTC Covington has said "I don't like systems" and "boxes are boring," some of the practices that he described are highly regularized, such as the structuring of guard and detail, and the maintenance routines for tanks and other equipment. LTC Garven's outline or program for training, spanning a full year, appears to be the least structured of the four, although he appeared, at the time of the interviews, to be moving in the direction of more structure.

With respect to the degree of centralization or decentralization of training management, LTC Madden's approach is open to some interpretation. He has said that he did all of the analysis and scheduling himself, in very much a "top down" manner, and yet what he scheduled were evaluation events for which the companies prepared as they saw fit and as time permitted. He also has spoken about conferring weekly with company commanders to update performance status charts. The inference drawn here is that LTC Madden developed the initial structure and guidance for training and that in practice the program was an interactive one with a fair amount of company commander input.

Both LTC Miller and LTC Garven expressed some disappointment in the ability of their company/battery commanders to organize adequate training programs, and each talked of moving from less-centralized to more-centralized control over training. In LTC Garven's battalion this took the form of running SQT training at battalion level for the highest density MOS. Of the four battalion commanders, LTC Covington appeared to have placed the greatest responsibility for control of training with his company commanders, even to the point of directing the S-3 to juggle requirements as possible to meet their requests for time and facilities.

As a brief comparative observation, both LTC Madden and LTC Covington identify the need for explicitness in goals and directives. An example from LTC Madden, "You couldn't just say qualified, you have to say qualified as a sharpshooter." LTC Covington made a similar point about the explicitness of questions that should be asked of subordinates.

With respect to evaluation, a significant element of training, there are not many obvious differences among the commanders. Each in some way referred to the integral nature of training and evaluation. LTC Garven and Madden both used the phrase "teaching the test." LTC Covington had his S-3 distribute copies of the quarterly tank gunnery test a month in advance. Three of the commanders indicated also that they rely on their own observation and judgments of unit performance as a key element in the evaluation process. Most commanders had some type of internal testing program in addition to externally-driven tests. LTC Miller was the only one who mentioned using the technique of a commander's quarterly inspection program which absorbed him and his staff for three days per company each quarter. Both LTC Madden and Covington mentioned techniques for recording and tracking subunit performance. LTC Covington also had as a policy that NCOs would be rated (EERs) based on the demonstrated performance of their soldiers.

Preparation for Command

Understandably there were variations in career progression represented among the four commanders prior to reaching command, although there was a good deal of commonality as well. An interesting sidelight is that both LTC Covington and LTC Garven had taught in the English Department at West Point. Commanders pointed to their time in units and particularly subordinate unit

command or staff time as affording the most important experience in preparing them for battalion command. All commanders had attended pre-command courses, and reviews of these were mixed. LTC Madden and LTC Covington also cited experience at TRADOC during the period that training doctrine was being revamped as having influenced their thinking. LTC Madden had been directly involved in portions of that process. In addition, LTC Garven and LTC Covington talked about going through a great deal of soul searching and thinking about battalion command for as much as six months prior to assuming command. This involved thinking about past battalion commanders, reading and thinking about doctrine, analyzing TO&Es, and planning tentative strategies for establishing control, developing a desired atmosphere and accomplishing their goals for their battalions.

Perspectives on the ARI/USAREUR Guidebook

The views on the approaches to training management in the ARI/USAREUR guidebook ranged from "unifying," to "compartmentalizing." While the commanders generally agree with the major practices of (1) analyzing missions, (2) specifying goals and standards, (3) assigning responsibility for accomplishment, (4) testing to measure progress, and (5) revising the program as indicated, only one of the four commanders gave an overall favorable evaluation to the guidebook. Otherwise, the guidebook was critized as being elementary, not going far enough into techniques, not being interesting or readable.

Possibly the most telling comments of all referred to the utility of guidebooks (and training management models) in general as a medium for influencing training management. The implications of these comments was that by the time battalion commanders and S-3s assume their positions, they pretty well have formulated their own approaches to managing training.

Review both of comments on the guidebook and discussions of practices within the several battalions has pointed up a number of areas and techniques which have not been addressed in the ARI/USAREUR guidebook. Some of the general areas which were mentioned that are not included in the guidebook are listed as follows:

Managing incentives
Creating a professional atmosphere
Structuring non-training time to promote learning
Professional development within the battalion confines
How to define goals
How to define standards
How to determine and allocate responsibilities
How to design and conduct evaluation events
How to collect and analyze evaluation data
Efficient scheduling techniques to minimize impact of inevitable support requirements

It is not suggested that all of these should or could be addressed, or that any training management guidance can be fully comprehensive. These are cited as additional areas into which subsequent research of training management techniques could further explore and elaborate.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. There are diverse ways of accomplishing the general management practices of goal setting, allocating of resources, setting up a management system for achieving goals, and measuring progress towards the goals. Some approaches to achievement of goals of sustainment focus on Army-wide policy changes. LTC Miller felt that the possibility for sustainment could best be improved by revising the manner and duration of unit assignments. (He further called for a comparative study of similar practices and policies among the NATO allies and the WARSAW Pact armies as well.) Such recommendations have received and continue to receive consideration by Army policy makers and, indeed, for each position there are pros and cons and implications of a systemic nature. As an example, longer tenures for battalion commanders would mean fewer command positions for upcoming military officers.

Other approaches to sustainment stress management techniques, i.e., given that external circumstances are not readily alterable, how can we manage to bring about the highest state of combat readiness with the available time and resources? Within this framework some emphasize management approaches, others stress leadership; some focus on professional development, others on collective training. And there is, understandably, interaction between a commander's personality and the style and techniques which he finds to be effective. All are managed from above by major events and evaluations and hence must work around those events and evaluations and use them to their advantage. No one set of techniques nor strategies appears to universally satisfy requirements.

2. All four commanders seem to be willing to accept attainment and sustainment as a theory--but if the reality is that full attainment rarely occurs, this might tend to make it difficult to convince NCO's and troops of the goal of sustainment for all.

3. Results of this work suggest a common preparation of officers for battalion command: past experience in similar battalions plus some reading plus possibly some brief training/education regarding management of training. The mechanized infantry commander had extensive experience in the theory of management of training and instructional technology. Yet this did not appear to make it possible for him to deal entirely with the extensive complexity of the multifaceted job of command, leadership and management. His analytic bent appears to have focused his attention on management: analysis of goals, measurement of performance, etc. to the underemphasis, perhaps, of professional development for leadership. The armor commander, on the other hand, seemed to emphasize leadership; judgment; eschewing of management techniques that rely on graphs, analytical products, etc. (although he in fact used many of these). This appears to have oriented him more to concern for incentives, for example, encouragement of NCO's in numerous face-to-face meetings; passing out numerous awards, and the like.

4. Clearly, all commanders should exhibit both good management and leadership practices. But their preparation, being left up primarily to a tutorial/experiential approach, with little well designed education, is not likely to promote balanced approaches to command and training management. The preponderence of negative views of training management guidance calls into question both the acceptability of prescriptive approaches to training management, as well as the utility of a guidebook as a medium for transmitting such concepts. More research should be given to the process of preparation of officers for command and also to alternative delivery systems for training management doctrine. Such research could shed light on the relative benefits and costs of approaches aimed at developing good training managers and approaches

aimed at disseminating management techniques and information. As an example, the current use of workshops for the implementation of TRADOC's BTMS (Battalion Training Management Systems) would appear to have the advantages of (1) removing training managers from the immediate demands of their units, (2) delivering management information at a time when it is most relevant and useful to the participants, and (3) "forcing" them to perform (though Performance Oriented Training) and develop prototype programs for their own units. It is also recognized that such an approach is highly resource intensive. Another type of study with considerable potential interest and value would be a broader survey of training management practices in USAREUR which have been developed within units to deal with the particular problems represented in this environment. It is believed from the current effort that the case study approach with profiles of battalion commanders could provide useful material for officers preparing for command of a battalion.

5. Training management is important. If it can be assumed that policies, support requirements, and resources allocations external to the battalion are not going to change dramatically in the near future, and if it is believed that many soldiers and units have not attained standards of combat readiness, then improvements in the latter condition can only be effected through improved practices and increased efforts in the areas of training and training management. This is an area of research and education that deserves a great deal of attention.

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APPENDIX A

COMMANDER'S TRAINING GUIDANCE & POLICIES

to 4th BATTALION 69th ARMOR

COMMANDER'S TRAINING MANAGEMENT BOOK

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SECTION I (COMMANDER'S TRAINING GUIDANCE & POLICIES) to 4TH BATTALION 69TH ARMOR COMMANDER'S TRAINING MANAGEMENT BOOK

1. The purpose of this section is to assist in more efficiently executing your primary function - combat readiness training - through effective training management and to establish battalion concepts, policies and procedures to be used in training.

2. The Army's training philosophy and its subordinate elements such as SQT are a revolutionary approach to training and it is essential that each officer and NCO understand that it is not simply a modification of business as usual or a re-invention of the wheel. Because it is revolutionary, it and we, will experience the growing pains that inevitably accompany "something new". This something new, however, is not simply a new way to do things but is a new outlook on how we should, and must, go about doing the Army's most essential business - that of preparing ourselves to win in war. History is replete with examples of how superior soldiers have overcome, often with ease, superior equipment, numbers, and other resources. Fortunately we have outstanding equipment, large numbers and a multitude of resources, but we are likely to be outnumbered and out-resourced. We need not be overly concerned so long as we are not out-soldiered and that is what our training concepts are all about.

a. It is essential that all leaders realize that this is a new and permanent approach to training. By its nature, it compels and will not work without the total dedication of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, for the first line NCO is the pivot point in Army training. In order to train well he needs three things (1) Personal expertise. (2) Training ability. (3) General direction. He gets the first from his own application and assistance from the next senior NCO's; the second from his senior NCO's and the third from his officer chain of command and his own analysis of his soldiers.

b. Officers have many jobs and managing training is one of them (see FM 21-6 and TC 21-5-7) but personally training individual soldiers, with few exceptions, is not one of them - that is an NCO duty and NCO's who do not do it well are not doing their job well. We must insure that our NCO's know this and that we do not act as though this is what we have always been doing - it is not - what we have always been doing is taking training out of our NCO's hand and assuming it as an officer function.

c. To assist the individual soldier, the Noncommissioned Officer trainer and the officer training manager, the Army is developing a wide range of aids designed to put training resources where the bulk of the training is accomplished - in the unit. This approach underlines a second major aspect of the Army training program, it is designed to be and must be decentralized. Central among these aids are the soldiers manuals which, as you know, specify critical tasks by MOS and skill level and the standards of performance required for each. It is essential that we train to those standards, and this is the third of the key planks in our daily training. It is in this area that we are experiencing the

greatest growing pains for soldiers manuals are not all published, TEC lessons are still being produced and many training aids are in various stages of development/production. In addition many publications including soldiers manuals will undergo revision as we move along. We should play a part in this procedure (a training management function) by making appropriate and realistic recommendations for changes to these products.

d. The SQT serves as a focal point for our year round training by providing a formal check on soldier ability to perform critical tasks but is also plays a part in determining soldier eligibility for promotion and is therefore, both a training and personnel management action. Once the test notice is out, it is perfectly acceptable and desirable to train to the test as the test is after all only a selection of items from the soldiers manual whose tasks and standards are the subject of year round training. Prior to publication of the test notices, it is expected that company training will be based on prioritizing critical tasks based on NCO and Company Commander analysis. The SQT simply does this once a year on an Army-wide basis.

3. The first year or so of implementation of this approach to training will be a challenge for which our best efforts and imagination will not be too much. We must guard particularly against inadvertently undercutting NCO responsibility, explicity through having officers do their jobs or implicitly by using policies and procedures which take it out of their hands. We must do this while insuring that the job is being done at the first line NCO level. I am convinced that the final result of this effort will be a better soldier, a better NCO, and a better Army that cannot be out-soldiered.

4. Understanding the fundamental philosophy [of the SQT program] and its corollaries is an essential first step but it is only a first step. Making it work requires thought, imagination, thought, innovation, thought and more thought. The keys to maximizing our training are development of aggressive technically qualified NCO trainers, improving our use of time available and using our own creativity to solve training problems.

a. The best trained units are and always will be those trained by their NCO's. In order to create this environment, I want NCO's evaluated largely on the demonstrated capabilities of their subordinates. Every first line supervisor should be able to tell anyone the exact training status of each man assigned to him by SQT task and the status of his crew/section by ARTEP T&EO. Obviously he must know what these tasks and T&EO's are in order to do this.

1. Our whole attitude toward maintenance must be reoriented. Maintenance includes care, cleaning, and training on the entire spectrum of equipment assigned to the battalion. The narrow focus usually adopted by Army units which views maintenance as long periods of time when hundreds of soldiers crawl around their tanks must go. It wastes time, discourages soldiers and usually does not get the job done. In this area the following principles apply:

a. When crews are performing maintenance, NCO's are expected to instruct and insure that soldiers are learning something about their vehicles and equipment, (how they run, preventive maintenance indicators, purpose for making checks, etc.). If a soldier works all day on his vehicle without really knowing what he is doing and why he is doing it, an NCO has failed.

b. If a crew has done everything necessary during a maintenance period, don't waste their time - immediately turn to Soldier's Manual Training maintenance of other equipment and occasionally giving the crew time off for exceptional performance.

c. Vehicle commanders are expected to know from memory the exact status of their vehicle to include past problems, current - 10 and 2404 entries, by item, tool shortages and projected problems (track wear, gun tube wear, next Q service, etc.).

d. Motor stables when well thought out and carefully executed can be valuable when not planned and conducted precisely, they are worthless. Units choosing to use motor stables will insure that they are periodic not daily, short and intensive not long and dull, oriented on specific not general objectives and accomplished perfectly not marginally.

e. Company level officers are expected to know how to conduct FSC inspections on their vehicles and do so monthly.

2. Technical competence on the part of our most crucial NCO leader/trainers (E6 and E7) is essential. General knowledge is not satisfactory.

a. Any NCO in these grades who fails to do extremely well on internal diagnostic tests, TGST, SQT and the like will be counselled and immediately pursue a program to upgrade his proficiency. Continued failure to improve significantly is sufficient grounds to recommend against promotion. In this area, the proof is in the pudding not the recipe.

b. This battalion has the resources (training aids, learning center and equipment) to allow every NCO to upgrade his technical competence. Tank Companies will take advantage of their Master Gunners to assist in this area.

3. Technical competence alone will not guarantee properly trained soldiers it must be paralleled by the ability to train well. Identifying outstanding trainers is simple - their soldiers know how to do what they are supposed to know how to do. The converse is equally true. The answer to improvement is in training the trainer (A senior NCO, officer assisted job) incorporating the following principles:

a. The First Sergeant of every company will consider himself to be the training NCO and primary trainer of trainers.

b. There is more than one way to skill a cat. NCO's must have the flexibility to use their imagination to each and to gear methods to the soldier(s) being taught. Every soldier is different and can be reached in different ways. If he hasn't learned, we usually haven't taught.

c. Determination of what to teach when not prescribed, must be based on knowledge of individual soldier/crew weaknesses and that means NCO's have to constantly evaluate soldier knowledge/ability.

d. No soldier should be released from training without conclusive proof of learning or specific follow up measures prescribed on the spot (learning center, recheck tomorrow, etc.).

e. Soldiers who master a subject should move on to something else while slower learners repeat until time or light run out.

f. Every learning session must include a critique and the critiques must be instructive (do not allow a soldier to leave a critique understanding only that he did something wrong, he must know how to do it right).

g. For most subjects, hands-on-training is at least three times as effective as classroom training. In the classroom avoid the old blackboard/lecture/pointer routine. A good trainer is part preacher, part actor - anything goes if it results in a demonstratable transfer of knowledge. The reaching method does not have to meet specific standards, the subject taught does.

b. Our most precious training ingredient is time; once wasted, it cannot be replaced and we have a lot to learn about conserving and effectively using it. Most of the after hours work done in the Army can be avoided by efficiently using time available during duty hours. We throw away a lot of useful time because of false ideas about its availability; the result is that we lost 40% of the time available. If we recoup only one-half of that, we can increase readiness by 33%. Doing it requires thought and application. The following principles and policies apply:

1. The notion that nothing can be taught unless you have an hour block and a group of soldiers must be eradicated. One soldier can be taught something by one NCO in ten minutes and when one soldier and ten minutes come together, that is what is expected.

2. Soldiers gather in many places, we must find these places and use them, (mess lines, test lines, admin lines, waiting areas, break areas) to teach/test or put up material that is instructive.

3. Recreation can be instructive in a variety of way. Tankers games and hand/eye coordination game machines can be placed in dayrooms, trips which incorporate training can be organized. Imagination is the only limit.

4. The notion that once a specified task is accomplished that the remaining time available is a break period is false. Any NCO who cannot carry on further training w/o specific instruction does not know his soldiers, his job, or both.

c. The constraints of small local training areas, short periods at the MTA's, and administrative requirements in Europe, make this the toughest training arena in the world. These constraints can be overcome only by applying imagination to the problems at hand. In order to do this, we must first overcome notions that we have to have certain things, (1500m visibility, standard ranges, etc.), in order to get the job done well. Anyone can achieve good results with maximum resources and FM designated facilities. They don't exist, and they aren't going to start existing, but they can be replaced and even improved on with imagination.

1. The name of the training game is "killing three birds with one stone". To do this training must be integrated at every level. Spending one hour learning to prepare to fire checks, one hour wearing the gas mask and one hour camaflouging a tank is a waste of two hours when all can be done simultaneously. Shoot for always getting three things done at once.

2. Things we want or need are frequently not in the inventory or don't exist however we can make our own or use the resources of the USAREUR training aids facilities.

3. We have not yet even scratched the surface on the use of video tape and recording devices.

4. Interesting training is effective training. Wherever and whenever we can inject realism or a unique twist to the way we train, we should do so and it can be done.

5. The following policies apply to training in the 4th Battalion, 69th Armored Regiment.

a. The S3 is the primary assistant battalion training manager in this capacity he will:

1. Maintain an 18-month planning calendar of projected training.

2. Act as the battalion time manager. No individual or staff agency will impose requirements on companies without coordinating through the S3.

3. Act as the battalion Deputy Test Control Officer (DTCO) for SQT and related testing.

4. Conduct bi-annual training management seminars with commanders and staff.

5. Provide each commander with a training management book and maintain a battalion training management book.

6. Conduct periodic battalion level diagnostic testing as follows:

a. TGST - Quarterly and as directed by the commander.

b. SQT - Annually when not otherwise required.

c. NBC Teams - Quarterly.

d. Special Testing of scouts, radar, AVLB, Redeye and Mortars as directed.

b. The bulk of battalion training will be decentralized to companies year round. Line Company Commanders will:

1. Maintain a 6 month projected training forecast.

2. Conduct monthly training analysis seminars with platoon leaders/ platoon Sgts and 1SG's to determine priorities for future training. Results will be recorded in training books.

3. Submit unit training schedules 5 weeks in advance. Schedules will:

a. Show Soldiers Manual Tasks to be emphasized during general training periods.

b. Show Q Services.

c. Show athletic competions regardless of hour.

d. Include at least one hour per week for NCO professionalism classes by 1SG's. Emphasis will be placed on technical competence, positive leadership and training the trainer. Subjects will be shown.

e. Include at least one period per month for officer professionalism classes by Company Commanders.

4. Conduct internal diagnostic testing to evaluate proficiency and determine training priorities.

5. Maintain crew stability cards on tank, mortar, GSR, scout and redeye crews/teams.

c. Battalion primary staff and special staff officers and senior NCO's are responsible for MOS peculiar training of their soldiers. HQ Commandant is responsible for general training and company related training and is the training manager for all.

d. All training will incorporate integrated instruction/experience. Priority will be given to:

1. NBC training with emphasis on masking, operations in masks decontamination and use of detection kits.

2. Night operations

3. Camaflouge and concealment.

4. Terrain driving.

5. Electronic warfare counter measures.

e. All training will incorporate a positive means of determining what has been learned and instructive critique. All soldiers should participate.

f. Each tank company will run the Armor Crew Tactical Training Course (ACTTC) and fire Tables I-III monthly.

g. Mortar platoon and FIST's will fire on the mini mortar range and conduct battery dry firing/hip shooting exercises monthly.

h. Each first line supervisor will carry his supervisors Soldier's Manual booklet(s) with him at all times. These booklets will be used and are subject to commanders inspection. Platoon Sergeants are expected to have the same information on crew/section NCO's.

i. Each tank and every other combat vehicle will carry, as they are issued, a combat training package. The purpose of this package is to have training material at hand wherever we are. Use them.

j. Secondary training stations will always be used wherever a primary training class/course keeps soldiers waiting (ACCTC, Tables I-III, hip shoots, etc.).

k. Battalion Master Gunners will meet monthly and make training recommendations to the Commander.

l. As a matter of principle it is to be understood that responsibility for continuing analysis and the conduct of training are as follows:

1. First line supervisor - Individual Soldiers Manual requirements for each of his soldiers, ARTEP requirements pertaining to his crew/section/team and special team training.

2. Platoon Sgts/Platoon Leaders - Soldiers Manual requirements for each first line supervisor, training the trainer and ARTEP requirements pertaining to the platoon. Except that tank platoon leaders have responsibility for (1) above for their tank crew also.

3. First Sergeants - Soldiers Manual requirements for platoon sergeants and other senior NCO's and training the trainer.

4. Company Commander - Overall company training management, officer instruction, and ARTEP requirements pertaining to the company.

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